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EDITORIAL

MR. TAWNEY'S BOOK

A cold day and a fireless grate provide perhaps an instructive setting for some reflexions on Mr. R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism**; for the withdrawal of the normal comforts of modern civilization, if it makes the hand move falteringly, at least gives the mind an added motive for trying to understand the causes of this condition. The book is stiff reading, which must be our excuse for some delay in reviewing it: you cannot get the gist of it quickly, nor master its main theme without careful attention to its details. In form it is a history—the history of the attempts and the lack of attempts to apply Christianity, in thought and deed, to the economic life of Christendom from the Middle Ages onwards. At the same time it is also a philosophy, at once political and religious; and it is this combination of philosophy with history which makes the book both profound and difficult. We know of no other study of the subject which is either so synoptic or so thorough; and for that reason alone it deserves a permanent place in every thoughtful man's library. Even though it be not clear—as to the present writer it is not—how exactly Mr. Tawney would have us solve the problem which he presents, we shall certainly thank him for having made it so real.

Briefly put, the thesis is something of this kind. In the medieval Church-State none of the characteristic activities of men were regarded as outside the purview and control of the Christian moral law. In those days, as in later ones, the motive of greed which consorts so easily with capitalism was frequently very potent; great financiers might die good Catholics; and the Papal Court itself was no stranger to the spirit of acquisition. Nevertheless, there was still no accepted divorce between

* John Murray, 1926, 10s. 6d. net.

economics and ethics. Avarice was still a sin; and theologians, confessors, and preachers could invoke the authoritative moral law and public opinion of Christendom to put it down. Nor was any change of principle brought about by the Reformation. "Gold," wrote Columbus, "constitutes treasure, and he who possesses it has all he needs in this world, as also the means of rescuing souls from Purgatory, and restoring them to the enjoyment of Paradise."* The Reformers would have reserved their sharpest darts, perhaps, for the second part of this saying; but they would have been quite unsparing also in their denunciation of the first. Not Latimer, nor Luther, nor Calvin would have tolerated it for a moment; and Calvin and his minions at Geneva used to drive home their invectives with penalties. That is one of the quite plain lessons of Mr. Tawney's book—that, wherever the dividing line between medieval and modern comes in the social ethics of Christendom, it does not come at the Reformation.

Not at least in the fact of the Reformation itself: for on this point there was a continuity of Christian teaching. But there is a sense in which the forces which helped to effect the Reformation were also decisive in their influence on social ethics. Two such were of predominant importance—the discovery of the New World, which made capital for exploration a necessity, and the rise of autonomous national States. It might fairly be said indeed that, while the Papists and the Protestants were locked in mortal combat, it was really Machiavelli who was carrying off the spoils. The new thing which emerges from that confused age, and which was to strut unabashed before men in the eighteenth century, was the doctrine of the economic man. That creed was "that the individual is absolute master of his own, and, within the limits set by positive law, may exploit it with a single eye to pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his own profit to the well-being of his neighbours, or to give account of his actions to a higher authority."† And it coincides with similar claims to absoluteness made in other fields besides the economic—in art, science, politics, and private conduct. What society has witnessed since the Reformation is the progressive emancipation from ecclesiastical control, if not from Christian sanctions altogether, of functional activities which at one time recognized the authority of the Church. It is reasonable to suppose that, in the reversal of this process likewise, the various activities will move more or less together: and already in science there are marked indications of a desire for a new synthesis. The recovery of a Christian

* Page 89. † Pages 146, 147.

social ethic, therefore, is likely to synchronize with—and can hardly precede—a general return of society, too long secularized, to the recognition of spiritual ends. The old Greek philosopher, Empedocles, thought of history as an alternation between two opposite eras of Strife and of Friendship. Mr. Tawney speaks of "co-operation" rather than of "friendship"; but the meaning is the same.

The essential problem, then, is a spiritual one—the clear presentation of "the ends to which effort should be applied, and the criteria by which its success is to be judged." Perhaps we might say that what we need is a new Augustine, and a new *City of God*. Meanwhile, the theologian and the preacher can do much to prepare the way for him, when he comes. It is scarcely deniable that Anglican preaching has been gravely defective in recent years in the power of setting before men a vision of the ends of life vivid and penetrating enough to act as a compelling motive upon their action. The rich and profound treatment of ethical issues which characterized Aquinas or Jeremy Taylor needs again to be resumed; and we must insist that psychology, useful as it is, is no surrogate for theology in this field. As Bishop Berkeley, whom Mr. Tawney quotes,* well said: "Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman."

In England, more perhaps than in any civilized country, religion and politics move together: and, in writing the fine conclusion to his book, Mr. Tawney must doubtless have had in his mind some concrete political and economic measures which he would wish to see adopted. The restraint which forbids him to speak of them here—he has, of course, done so elsewhere—is not one of the least of the merits of this book; since it not only enhances the impression of the paramount importance of motive and end for the redemption of society, but also stimulates the reader to do his own thinking in this regard. If the present writer were asked to say, on the basis of his seven years' experience of village life, what kind of land legislation he thought most needed, he would name two reforms which would probably cut little ice in an election, but might for all that be of very practical service. One is the legal registration of commons and common rights. The pathetic cry of Widow Grimbley in Dr. Jessopp's

* Page 284.

In Arcady—"There ain't no room in this world now for the *Little Ones*. That's the law!"—is still echoed wherever the common rights of cottagers are encroached upon or their age-long privileges cut off. But is it the law? They cannot afford to find out by resort to the courts: but registration would settle it. The other is the application to the administration of estates of the same kind of supervision as is already in force with regard to factories. This would be far less expensive and more immediately practicable than nationalization, and would enable public opinion to express itself, not in a change of Government which so often changes nothing else, but in the enforcement of a positive standard in the administration of estates. Bad administration to-day is commonly charged to "the system": it is much more obviously due to the lack either of means or of knowledge in the landlord; and, if these obstacles can be surmounted in the case of factories, it is difficult to see why they should not yield to similar treatment in the case of land.

We cannot conclude our review of Mr. Tawney's book without alluding to the large number of apt aphorisms which sparkle in its pages. "After nearly four centuries, Luther's apprehensions of a too hasty establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven appear somewhat exaggerated" (p. 94).

"Sceptical as to the existence of unicorns and salamanders, the age of Machiavelli and Henry VIII. found food for its credulity in the worship of that rare monster the God-fearing Prince" (p. 102).

"The certainties of one age are the problems of the next" (p. 28).

Such are a few specimens of Mr. Tawney's pregnant pen: they are to be found on almost every page, and do much to add to the reader's pleasure.

Those who believe that the restoration of the Church's unity involves, and must rest upon, a real theological synthesis will be grateful to these representative scholars outside our own communion who contribute the critiques of *Essays Catholic and Critical* which we publish to-day. Of the various problems which they handle the most immediately relevant is probably that concerned with authority; and each finds something to seek in the Anglican position as set forth in the essays. In the case of Professor Bulgakoff it is ecclesiastical tradition, and in particular the place of the Old Testament within it, which he misses; in the cases of both Monseigneur Batiffol and Dr. Anderson Scott it is the answer to the more definite question

where and in whom the required authority lies. Dr. Anderson Scott states his dissatisfaction, without indicating how he would remove it. Monseigneur Batiffol, on the other hand, writes as one who is prepared to urge the claims of a more thorough doctrine, and a more actual embodiment, of authority to fill the gap. At the same time it is important to notice that Monseigneur Batiffol makes a distinction between what is Catholic, and what is only Western, in Papal authority; and thus opens a line of possible progress which may prove very fruitful. Dr. Brilioth, who also finds evidence of incompleteness in the synthesis attempted by the essayists, attributes it especially to an inadequate recognition of the religious significance of Protestantism. The second edition of the book is now in the press; but we hope that it may be possible for these and other criticisms which have appeared to be considered and discussed at some later date.

COPERNICUS AND CHRISTIANITY

THE assertion "that the Copernican astronomy revolutionized man's view of his relation to the universe is, to say the least," writes Dr. Illingworth, "a considerable over-statement of the case."*

Such is not Dr. Inge's judgment, and his judgment cannot be overlooked. Himself an influential writer, in this recent book *Science, Religion, and Reality* he collaborates with Lord Balfour, Professor C. C. J. Webb, and others of note, and it is sure to be widely read. For him, "the destruction of the geocentric view of the universe by the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo" constitutes "the greatest problem which the Christian Church has ever had to face." And he asks: "Do Christians accept those verdicts of astronomical science which seem to be surely established, with those modifications of traditional theology which they imply, or do they not?"

Three courses only, he decides, are open to the Church:

1. To condemn modern astronomy as impious and heretical.
2. To say that these traditional doctrines are symbolic, not belonging to the natural order with which science deals, but possessing a higher truth than scientific laws.
3. To recast all theological doctrines which rest upon the geocentric theory. In what form the recast doctrines are to appear he does not explain.

The first, no Christian dreams of. It was Jesuits who introduced the modern astronomy into China, and they defended Kepler. Romanes in his *Thoughts on Religion* gives a list of splendid scientists at Cambridge in his time, among them Adams, discoverer of Neptune, who were all sincere Christians. When I was at Oxford the Professor of Astronomy, Pritchard, was a priest. The second is out of the question for a religion like Christianity, which stands on historical and scientific fact. We are left with the third, and to begin with we must enquire what the Dean means by the geocentric theory. He states it thus:

"THE GEOCENTRIC HYPOTHESIS."

"The Christian map of the universe" was "the earth . . . the centre of a finite universe, like a dish with a dish-cover over it." "Until that time (of Copernicus) the ordinary man,

* *Divine Immanence*, c. i.

whether educated or uneducated, had pictured the sum of things as a three-storeyed building, consisting of heaven, the abode of God, the angels, and beatified spirits; our earth; and the infernal regions, where the devil, his angels, and lost souls are imprisoned and tormented."

The theological doctrines which are supposed to rest upon this geocentric theory are those of the bodily Resurrection of our Lord, His bodily Ascension, and the Resurrection of the Dead—the same that the Dean has before (in *Outspoken Essays*, I. and II.) pronounced to be discredited by Copernican astronomy. He recurs to the objection to a spatial and temporal heaven again in his *Platonist Tradition in English Religious Thought* (1926, L. IV.).

Harnack in *Luke the Physician* remarks on how "one critic trustfully rests upon the authority of another." And so this dish-cover and three-storeyed building notion has itself become almost a dogma, a tradition accepted without further enquiry by many, and we meet it pretty frequently in modern criticism.

The suggestion, of course, is that, when Christianity began, the simple-minded outlook of mankind in general, upon a small, homely universe of this kind, rendered credible, both to Christians and to the society of that age, conceptions of Resurrection and Ascension equally simple-minded; and that these, once embodied in the Creed, and backed, as was thought, by the Bible, chained the intelligence of Christendom till Copernicus burst like a thunder-clap upon the world. Since then, these Articles, literally understood, have been no longer tenable.

Change not Vital, nor the Theory New.

There are really two sides to this business, and by far the more important is whether the astronomers themselves have been demanding that these Articles shall be discarded or transformed. As far as I have observed, it is as true to-day as in St. Augustine's time that it is not so much the scientists as the Platonists who are scandalized.* It would be officious of the Church to tell these exceedingly capable men, "You have no right to believe all the Creed now we have become heliocentric." Kepler and Christopher Wren and Flamsteed and Halley and Isaac Newton were well able to judge for themselves, and all these astronomers were firmly Christian. There is no more ground for calling Newton an Arian than for calling Locke a Deist. Newton and Locke and John Evelyn, and the redoubtable Bentley and Wren—"no child could hold the truths of Christianity with a more undoubting faith than Sir Christopher

* *De Cat. Rudibus* on "He ascended into heaven."

Wren"—were friends who used to forgather every week. Newton was counted an "excellent divine."

Here is the opinion of a modern astronomer, Mr. Walter Maunder, of the Royal Observatory, Greenwich: That it was always simply a matter of evidence; and till the evidence decided it, "whether the earth goes round the sun, or the sun goes round the earth . . . for a scientific or a religious man" did not affect "his fundamental standing or his mental attitude towards either earth or sun. In this respect—important as the question is in itself—it might be said to be a detail, almost a matter of indifference." "It was really a conflict between two schools of science," and "neither then nor now had either scientific theory, Ptolemaic or Copernican, a right to claim a theological standing."* This writer does not mention any reserves in his Christian faith; nor does he speak as if a revolution had occurred.

There is a scene which might be taken as typical. It occurs in the life of Sir William Herschel, that great man who thrilled the scientific world by adding a sixth planet to the ancient Five; on whose tomb is written, *Cœlorum perrupit claustra*, because he had explored the depths of space beyond the remotest dreams of Copernicus or Galileo, for before his time the stars "were thought to lie beyond the reach of effective investigation"; who had been for seventeen years a church organist; who spoke of himself as a pupil coming to "receive instruction from the great Work-master of Nature"; whose desire for his son John, senior wrangler at Cambridge, and destined to follow so nobly in his father's footsteps, both as astronomer and Christian, was that he should take Holy Orders. We see this great astronomer leading the pious King George III. and the Archbishop of Canterbury to his huge forty-foot telescope still lying on the ground. And the two walked right through it, the King giving his hand to his companion and saying, "Come, my lord Archbishop, I will show you the way to heaven."† That scene may stand as emblematic of the fact that any feud there might have been between the Church and astronomy had long been happily composed. It was that same old philosophy of St. Augustine's day which was irreconcilable; as it is still.

But in fact the Ptolemaic theory had very naturally got a theological standing, as the Church had grown up in that atmosphere. The heliocentric theory, therefore, came as a violent shock both to established science and established religious ideas. Earth and man seemed to be reduced to such

* *Astronomy of the Bible*, c. vi., 4th edition, 1922.
† A. M. Clerke, *The Herschels*.

insignificance that the tremendous doctrines of Christianity were felt to be in jeopardy.

It would lead beyond our immediate purpose and unduly lengthen this paper to discuss the subject. The difficulty is familiar, and has been constantly treated. The defence of the faith will always resolve itself into some such words as are used by one of our wisest modern philosophers, who declares to be "woven into the very texture of his philosophy" his "conviction of the essential greatness of man, and the infinite nature of the values revealed in his life."*

The more special claim which Dean Inge never wearies of asserting—namely, that the new astronomy overthrew certain Christian doctrines—is, so far as I know, an objection peculiar to himself, and is difficult to follow. In what manner the discovery that the world was larger than had been supposed destroyed the possibility of a spatial and temporal heaven, is not easy to see.

To keep, however, to our present enquiry, whereas the old scientific theory died of that shock, the Church quickly began to recover, as it did later, when first geology upset the date 4004, and then evolution demolished special creations. The Church came to realize that there was nothing specifically Christian or explicitly Scriptural in Ptolemy's scheme. More than that, it was quite soon known that Copernicus was saying nothing new, but was reviving an ancient theory, which had been amply discussed and for good reasons—scientific, not religious reasons—laid aside.

Nor would it be forgotten that the learned Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64), prominent at the Council of Basle, Bishop, Papal Legate to Constantinople, had been proclaiming that the earth turns on its axis and moves round the sun, a century before the appearance of Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus*. Copernicus (1473-1543) himself had high ecclesiastical support. He addressed that famous treatise to the Pope Paul III., and tells him that he publishes it at the urgent instance of two dear and scholarly friends the Cardinal of Capua, Nicholas Schonberg, and the Bishop of Kulm, Tideman Gisius.† Indeed, if we may judge from casual correspondence, long before Nicholas of Cusa again, the educated must have been well aware that our earth is not the largest of heavenly bodies, and that the universe is no small affair. Suso, a German mystical writer and great popular preacher (1295-1365), was a Dominican Friar, and a disciple of Eckhart, shortly after the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. In an ordinary pastoral letter to a lady he bids her admire the

* Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, L. xii.

† Whewell, *Astronomy and Natural Theology* (1834).

heaven "adorned with seven planets, each of them much bigger than the whole earth."* "The Seven Planets" was a common title, used *e.g.*, by St. John of Damascus, for the sun, moon, and the five Wanderers.

Galileo (1564-1642) was in trouble with the Aristotelians long before the Church officially took a hand. In 1611, after he had become famous and had made many astronomical discoveries, he was received with great honour at Rome, and Cardinal Barberini, afterwards Pope Urban VIII., celebrated his achievements in Latin verse. It is likely that, had he not been thought to be covertly satirizing that Pope in his *Dialogo* in the character of Simplicio, he would never have had his hard treatment from the Inquisition. Even then there was no Christian doctrine that he was charged with impugning. His thesis had been twice approved by papal censors, at Rome and at Florence; the grievance now chiefly alleged was that it contradicted the account of Joshua and the Sun. Legend has been busy with the whole event. Galileo, it appears, was not tortured; his prison was a stately house with gardens where he wrote his letters and received his friends; and *e pur si muove* is an invention of the eighteenth century.†

Aristarchus of Samos.

"Copernicus tells us himself how he was led to think of the earth as a planet revolving round a central luminary, by reading in a work ascribed to Plutarch that the Pythagoreans had taught this doctrine. He learnt too from Archimedes that Aristarchus of Samos had announced in the third century B.C. that the simplest hypothesis on which the apparently irregular motions of the planets could be accounted for, was that the sun was the centre of the system and that the earth was a planet. He had further opened up a new view of the immensity of the universe by calling attention to the absence of observable parallax in the fixed stars." So Professor John Burnett in *Higher Education and the War*, chap. ii. (1917).

Primitive and Hebrew Cosmogony.

The dish-cover map represented, we must suppose, the primitive Hebrew cosmogony as well as the earliest Greek and Babylonian. There is a picture of it in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible* ("Cosmogony"). Long after it had been superseded it might seem to persist, for the reason that the Northern hemi-

* Quoted in Underhill, *Mystics of the Church*, c. vii.
† *Dict. de Biographie universelle.*

sphere was plotted out in constellations, while the Southern remained blank. And this, as Maunder says, was because these constellations must have been designed by people living between the 40th and 37th or 36th parallels of North latitude, who had never seen the Southern stars.* They would see rather less of the Southern stars than we do of the Northern from Cape Town or Sydney. Even our glorious Southern Cross was not named till the sixteenth century; it had been reckoned part of the Centaur. And right on in the Middle Ages there were Western astronomers who maintained that the Southern hemisphere had no stars at all.† To the Hebrews the stars are always wonderful, they stand as the very symbol of multitude; they call forth praise of the might and wisdom of God:

> "Great is the Lord and mighty in power;
> His understanding is infinite.
> He telleth the number of the stars
> And giveth them all their names."

But that simplicity had long passed when the Christian Church came out into a Græco-Roman civilization in which there was keener intellectual movement and more widely diffused education than was known at any later period till the thirteenth century or perhaps the Renaissance. Astronomy, most ancient of sciences, in particular, had long left the cradle. Even in the Old Testament Maunder shows us most interesting counterparts in the stars of Woman and Corn Ear, Man trampling Scorpion, Cherubim (Lion, Man, Bull, Eagle), and Ark and Altar and Bow. He has the advantage of knowing Hebrew, and can clear up mistakes. For instance, he shows how "firmament" is simply "expanse," the atmosphere; the waters above the firmament are the rainy clouds; the "firmament of heaven," the starry sky. When we read of "the birds that fly before the face of the expanse of heaven" (*al-penay rakya hashamaim*), it means no more than Shelley means, when he hails the skylark, "Who from heaven or near it Pourest thy full heart." It was the Seventy at Alexandria who rendered "expanse" by "stereoma" (Latin *firmamentum*), because the current doctrine was of solid crystalline spheres in which sun, moon, and planets were fixed. They no doubt considered that with "the idea of a solid structure they were speaking the last word of up-to-date science."‡ St. Augustine, discoursing on Genesis, clearly distinguishes firmament, meaning "the starry sky," from firmament, meaning "the space of the air in which the clouds are condensed."

* *Astronomy of the Bible*, bk. ii., c. i. † Orr, *Stars of the Southern Skies*.
‡ Maunder, c. iv.

Hebrew and Christian Struggle against Idolatry and Astrology.

The interest of the Hebrews in nature was always definitely religious, though thereby they were serving well the cause of pure science. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." "These first words of Genesis," Maunder comments, "may be called the charter of all the physical sciences, for by them is conferred freedom from all the bonds of unscientific superstition; and by them also do men know that scientific law holds throughout the universe. It is the intellectual freedom of the Hebrew that the scientist of to-day inherits."

How hard a battle the Hebrews had to fight against star-gazers and star-worshippers we read all through the Old Testament; and Christians, with their primary object religious and moral, had to carry on the same fierce struggle for intellectual and spiritual freedom. For in those days, when so many could read and write, and when books were very cheap, astrology was the chief enemy of free thought and knowledge. Once again, as always, true religion was on the side of science. Edwyn Bevan tells us* of "the great masses of the people in the Greco-Roman world. When men looked up to the stars they shuddered to see there the powers whose mysterious influence held them in the mechanism of an iron necessity." Even the brilliant Augustine in his unregenerate days was snared by "the impious dotages of the astrologers."† This abomination had swept into the Roman world from Chaldæa; and originally restricted, as Jastrow tells us, to foretelling only public events, the destiny of kings and kingdoms, it now claimed to determine the life-course of private individuals.

This was the "deadly blight," the "bastard science," as Maunder calls it, which was sucking the life from astronomy and made it barren from Ptolemy's day onwards. Ptolemy‡ had no successor, Miss Clerke agrees. But it is utterly untrue, Maunder says, that astronomy grew out of astrology. The exact contrary is the case. "Astrology does not contribute, has not contributed a single observation, a single demonstration to astronomy." It simply corrupts for its own base uses the truths astronomy had won. So we have to look back, as the early Christians did, to the golden age of Greek astronomy. For that the Greeks had done, and it is our present point, they had emancipated the minds of men, and Christian minds among the rest, from confinement in a three-storeyed building.

* *Hellenism and Christianity*, iv. † *Confessions*, bk. vii.
‡ Claudius Ptolemy, *floruit* Alexandria, A.D. 139-161.

Early Heliocentric Conjectures.

Those old Greeks were indeed men of science. "The idea of disinterested scientific enquiry," says Burnet, "was perhaps the greatest gift of Hellas to mankind"; and Heath bears witness to their "passionate love of knowledge for its own sake, and a genius for speculation which stands unrivalled to this day." Though there had been much of astronomy in Egypt and Babylon, scientific astronomy began with the Greeks, Miss Clerke considers.* They had produced a succession of astronomers, both instrumental and mathematical, of whom our race may be proud.

The astronomer Sir Thomas Heath, in *The Copernicus of Antiquity*, by whom he means Aristarchus of Samos (about 310-230 B.C.), gives the passages referred to from Archimedes and Plutarch. The former told King Gelon this about Aristarchus: "His hypotheses are that the fixed stars and the sun remain unmoved, that the earth revolves about the sun in the circumference of a circle, the sun lying in the middle of the orbit; and that the sphere of the fixed stars, situated about the same centre as the sun, is so great that the circle, in which he supposes the earth to revolve, bears such a proportion to the distance of the fixed stars as the centre of the sphere bears to its surface." Archimedes was a younger contemporary of Aristarchus, and his evidence is good.

Plutarch (A.D. 46-120) in his tract *On the Face of the Moon's Orb*, speaks of Aristarchus "in his attempt to save the phenomena, supposing the heaven to remain at rest, and the earth to revolve in an oblique circle, while it rotates, at the same time, on its axis." Again, in article "Astronomy" we read that Cicero (*Acad. Quest.*, iv., 39) on the authority of Theophrastus, the friend and successor of Aristotle, speaks of a Nicetas (Hiketas of Syracuse, 4th century B.C.), who taught that the sun and stars stayed still, but that the earth turning on its axis and moving in a circle makes it look as if the heaven were moving and the earth at rest. "Copernicus himself could not have stated the doctrine with greater precision."†

Greek Astronomy.

It was generally accepted that earth, moon, sun, stars were all spherical, and Aristarchus reckoned the sun to be 300 times greater than the earth; it is more than a million times greater. Eratosthenes, born a few years after Archimedes, calculated

* Art. "Astronomy," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th edition.

† *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th edition.

the earth's circumference in stades at what comes to 24,662 miles, and its diameter at 7,850, " a surprisingly close approximation," says Heath. Hipparchus (150 B.C.) reckoned the moon's mean distance from the earth at 67⅓ times the radius of the earth. It is, I believe, about 60. He made the moon's diameter to be one-third of the earth's, whereas it is rather more than a fourth. Posidonius (135-51 B.C.) got nearest to the distance of the sun, and that was not very near, putting it at 13,090 times the earth's radius, whereas it is some 23,220. Let it be remembered, however, as Christie tells us, that in 1862 it was found that previous calculations had over-estimated the sun's mean distance by three million miles.

As to the distance of the stars, the Greeks, not knowing the speed of light, with only their astrolabe and armilla, with no telescopes, large or small, and with limited base, could make no estimate. Even to get the height of the moon our astronomers worked from Greenwich and Capetown. It was known that the stars were farther than the sun and any planet. Anaximenes (585-528 B.C.) put the fixed stars " on a crystal sphere as on a rigid frame," and his system, says Heath, " really remained the fundamental principle in all astronomy down to Copernicus (1473-1543)." But not Copernicus nor Galileo could measure that terrific distance. Only in the first half of the nineteenth century, I find in Wallace,* were definite distances of the stars obtained, and then only in three cases.

The Astronomer Royal of the Cape informs me that " our knowledge of stellar distances was still very slight at the end of the nineteenth century. But progress since then has been very rapid, and the distances of between two and three thousand stars have now been determined with a high degree of accuracy."

Failure of Aristarchus: the Ptolemaic System.

Aristarchus's heliocentric scheme did not win the day. It did not commend itself to Hipparchus, whom Wallace and Clerke put among the greatest astronomers of the world. Heath tells us that Hipparchus definitely reverted to the geocentric system, " and it was doubtless his authority which sealed the fate of the heliocentric hypothesis for so many centuries." Presumably the reason for his rejection of it was that a circular movement of the earth round the sun as centre does not " save the phenomena "—that is, correspond to the facts. It was for the same scientific reason, and not out of theological motive, that the eminent Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) refused to accept the Copernican hypothesis, and preferred

* *Wonderful Century.*

a modification of the Ptolemaic. It was not till Kepler, Galileo's friend and Brahe's successor (1571-1630), produced the first of his famous "Three Laws," that the heliocentric view made way. That is, to quote Christie's little manual, that "the planets (including our earth) describe an ellipse (not a circle) of which the sun occupies one focus."

Such, then, was the information which had been accumulated by these admirable pioneers in the course of six hundred years, and which was arranged and consolidated by Claudius Ptolemy in the second century of our era. It was imperfect, as we now know, but concerning the solar system much had been learnt.

The earth, sun, moon, planets, were all spheres, suspended somehow in space. The size of the earth and of the moon were known approximately, and the distance of the moon. The sun was vastly larger than the earth, and was millions of miles away, though both size and distance were very greatly underestimated. The stars were much farther away than sun or planets, and were probably spheres fixed on some kind of frame. Their size and distance were unknown, but their position and grouping had been long familiar, for as Maunder remarks, this was necessary before the planets could be distinguished. Hipparchus had catalogued 1,025 stars, and classified them in six magnitudes. Of this system our earth was the centre, though bold men like the Pythagoreans and Aristarchus, and apparently Hiketas, had put forward the theory that the sun was central and stationary, while the earth revolved round it and turned on its axis. At any rate, the universe was really one and orderly, and it was a field in which science could work, if delivered from the obsession of astrology.

This may be called the official cosmogony of the civilization in which the Church grew up. These facts must be well known to the Dean of St. Paul's, who is versed in the wisdom of the Greeks.—I frankly confess that my acquaintance with them is chiefly gathered out of articles and easy books. And we may ask, with a little touch of remonstrance, whether the likeness he draws is not a somewhat over-domestic similitude. And was there anything in this outlook on heaven and earth to originate or favour belief in the Resurrection and Ascension ?

This science in course of time accepted Christianity, and Christianity this science, and they dwelt amicably together for many centuries. But even in that world the earth was small, and a man very small; and the unbeliever could, and did, utter then all his contempt for Christianity and its miracles and claims, which seemed so out of keeping with man's insignificance. When it was proved that the earth is not central, and when

the immensity of the universe was gradually revealed, the contrast became more intense, as we have acknowledged, but not essentially different in character. To call it a revolution does appear to be a considerable over-statement. The heart of the question was then, and is now, what we think of Christ.

The Early Church and Astronomy.

It would be an interesting study to trace the process of assimilation of this science by the Church, and the way in which it was brought into relation with the cosmogony of Genesis. Origen has quaint ideas about Paradise, but he is quite prepared to accept the planets as worlds, and indeed other worlds if there be any. Living as he did in Alexandria, the metropolis of astronomy, and coming soon after Ptolemy, he must have known something of these matters. St. Basil (330-379) in his *Hexæmeron*, weekday sermons, with many working men in the congregation, shows full knowledge of Aristotle's *De Cælo*, which discusses the Pythagorean hypothesis. He had taken astronomy as one of his subjects at Athens university, and he makes full claim on behalf of reason in such investigations. His friend St. Gregory of Nazianzum loved the *Hexæmeron ;* and he was president for a time of the Council of Constantinople. The *Hexæmeron* was very widely read, and we even find an abridgement made of it in the tenth century in Anglo-Saxon. St. John of Damascus (676-734) gives us quite an astronomical treatise in the Second Book of his *Orthodox Faith.* Both he and Basil vigorously condemn astrology and defend the freedom of the will. By that time Alexandria and its famous school had fallen. Omar had captured it in 641, and astronomy was to begin a new life in Bagdad with the translation of Ptolemy's *Almagest.*

This older knowledge was communicated to the Church on the high authority of St. Thomas Aquinas, who freely cites Strabo, Aristotle, Ptolemy, St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, the Damascene, in his account of Creation. The light divided from the darkness means, he says, that " in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness." And in his interpretation of Scripture, following St. Augustine, he uses words which might be commended to the Fundamentalists: " In questions of this kind (scientific, that is) there are two things to be observed. The first is that the truth of Scripture should be upheld unshaken. The second is that divine Scripture can be explained in various ways. Therefore no man ought to commit himself so decidedly to one explanation, that, if it is

shown by sound reason (*si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, quod aliquis sensum Scripturæ esse credebat*) that what he believed to be the sense of Scripture is incorrect, he nevertheless insist on its being the right one. By so doing he may cause Scripture to be laughed at by outsiders, and may put a hindrance in the way of their approach to the faith." And so he agrees with St. Chrysostom that Moses had to deal with an uneducated people, and had to explain some matters according to their sense-appearance which the people could understand. St. Thomas was not one to balk at heliocentrism or any other scientific fact, once he was clear that it had solid reason on its side (*Summa Theologica*, Pars Prima, Quæst. 67, Art. 4; Quæst. 68. Art. 1).

But much earlier, and even in Apostolic times, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, as amongst ourselves, a fair amount of this knowledge was common property.

A university man like St. Paul, educated gentlemen like St. Barnabas or St. Luke, would not be quite in the dark. As to St. Paul we are sure he was not. "The earliest complete description of the constellations," writes Maunder, "was the poem of Aratus of Soli, the *Phenomena*, published about 270 B.C." There is a list of forty-eight constellations, and it is almost exactly the same as Ptolemy's. The poem was greatly admired and very popular. Aratus was a Cilician, a Stoic, and had been educated at Athens. And it was at Athens, in the presence of Stoics and Epicureans, that St. Paul, a fellow Cilician, scholar of Stoic Tarsus, one of the three great universities of the Roman world, quoted, no doubt with acceptance, from the opening lines of this poem of Aratus:

> "In every place our need of Him we feel,
> For we His offspring are."

J. O. Nash,
Community of the Resurrection,
Coadjutor-Bishop of Capetown.

REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS COMMISSION.—II.

In recent times reformers and would-be reformers of the Ecclesiastical Courts have manifested a great affection for assessors. Their zeal in this matter, however, has not always been according to knowledge, since due care has sometimes not been taken to consider carefully the functions of assessors or the indirect consequences of their appointment. The late Mr. Justice Stephen subjected the theory of assessors to a critical analysis, which may profitably be considered in the present connection, though it was written for the purposes of a very different controversy.* In substance, Sir FitzJames Stephen propounds three dilemmas, which may be summarized as follows:

(*a*) If the assessor, not himself being the tribunal of fact, is to decide certain issues of fact, he usurps the function of the tribunal of fact.

(*b*) If he is to decide certain issues of law he usurps the function of the judge, or rather he becomes the judge for the purpose in hand.

(*c*) If he be a mere "expert" to advise the tribunal of fact or law on certain matters, why should he not be examined and cross-examined like any other expert; why should one expert have the exclusive privilege of advising the Court in secret, so that the parties do not know what his opinion is, and cannot test it by cross-examination?

Any system of assessors must, I think, suffer itself to be tested by the above considerations. The scheme of the Commission clearly survives the first test, since they define an assessor as one "who advises the judge, but has no voice in any decision." This definition in part meets the second test. That an assessor should have a mere advisory function upon issues of law did not occur to Sir FitzJames Stephen, since in relation to the matters he was discussing any judge must be assumed to know the law better than any hypothetical assessor. But in ecclesiastical matters this is not necessarily so; the theology of the Church is no doubt a question of law and not fact, but an ecclesiastical judge is not deemed to be an expert theologian in the same sense in which he is or should be expert in ecclesiastical law ordinarily so-called. I think, therefore, that the theological expert satisfies or rather avoids the application of the second test. The liturgical assessor is in somewhat more doubtful case, since it is not so clear that his function is

* *History of the Criminal Law*, 1883, vol. i., pp 575-576.

to advise on issues of law only, but on the whole I think it must be so regarded. The real difficulty arises in giving a satisfactory answer to the third proposition. Suppose that on a question of theology there are three recognized experts, X, Y, and Z. X is chosen as assessor, Y and Z are called as experts. Y and Z must state their views publicly, and submit to cross-examination. X sits on the Bench and gives his views in private; they cannot be so tested. How is the Court to judge between expert evidence on the same subject tendered under such diverse conditions? The difficulty can, of course, be summarily surmounted by providing that when an assessor is appointed the parties shall not be permitted to call expert evidence on the subjects on which he is called upon to advise the Court. I think myself that this is, in fact, the only solution of the difficulty, and the necessary consequence of introducing the expert assessor. It is the solution adopted in the Admiralty jurisdiction, where alone in our Courts expert assessors are normally to be found. If this solution be adopted, the system of assessors proposed seems free of objection, and I think most Chancellors would welcome it. But has the Church, has the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, considered the consequences of accepting it and counted the cost?

No question is likely to be raised as to the functions of the legal assessor when the bishop sits in person, nor is such an assessor bound to satisfy the tests indicated above. The legal adviser of a non-professional tribunal occupies a well-understood position, and requires no elaborate justification. It may, however, be noted that the Commission accord his proper position to the Chancellor in making him the only recognized legal assessor, so long as he is fit and able to sit. The provision in the Church Discipline Act, whereby the bishop can very readily appoint a legal assessor other than his Chancellor, is explicable only in view of the circumstances prevailing in 1840 to which I have already referred. If a Chancellor be not the fittest and most proper person to sit as assessor to his bishop, this necessarily implies his unfitness to be Chancellor at all.

Although the system of assessors proposed by the Commission is, subject to the points above discussed, a consistent system, this cannot be said of the law as to assessors which now prevails. The assessors under the Church Discipline Act, 1840, conform to the definition adopted by the Commission; they "advise," but "have no voice in any decision," but the so-called "assessors" under the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, completely contradict the definition, and can only be called "assessors" by an abuse of language. So far are they from "having no voice in any decision" that they are the sole judges of fact. They are

a jury in all but name, but, unlike every other jury, they sit on the Bench, and, as to questions of fact, the Chancellor is one of and with them. It is not quite clear what the Commission propose as to this odd, indeed unique, tribunal. I do not think they intend its continuance; I do not imagine that they contemplate any system of assessors in addition to that which they outline, nor one which is at variance with their own definition.* If this be so, however, and no substitute be provided, it would result that charges of immorality would be tried by the Chancellor alone, or by the bishop with the Chancellor as assessor. It was to relieve a single judge of the responsibility of deciding questions of fact of this kind that the so-called "assessors" were introduced. For my own part I should be glad to see charges of immorality and negligence tried by the Chancellor and a jury of clergy, drawn, if necessary, from a neighbouring diocese, called in plain terms a "jury," and not misnamed as "assessors." If I am not greatly mistaken, this would improve the procedure and increase confidence in the tribunal.

A clear and consistent theory as to the functions of assessors and expert witnesses is also required in reference to Advisory Committees. These Committees, of the value of whose work I need not speak, are "extra-legal," in the sense that the law takes no account of them, and when they were set up no great amount of thought seems to have been given to the exact legal relation they ought to bear to the Chancellor. This was not altogether a bad thing, since it has enabled Chancellors, who fortunately control to a large extent their procedure in these matters, to make a number of experiments, which still continue. In some dioceses the Committee tends to be a body of expert witnesses rather than assessors, in others the contrary; in still others it occupies a position which combines some of the functions of both with some of neither. The conclusions so far drawn are, I think, largely provisional, nor are the facts on which they can be based known to many persons outside the ranks of the Chancellors. But I know no one who supposes that Advisory Committees can permanently remain wholly "extra-legal," and in such a reform of the Courts as is now indicated their functions will no doubt be defined and some uniformity of practice attained. The legal aspects of this problem are not without difficulty, but considerable *data* bearing upon it have been quietly accumulated.

* If the "assessors" under this Act are treated as true "assessors" their presence can only be explained on the ground that they are experts on the question on what evidence adultery and the like ought to be held proved. So to treat them involves an equal insult to their characters as to the professional attainments of the Chancellor.

The details of procedure, important though they be to the smooth working of any system of law, cannot fittingly be canvassed here. But upon the report of the recent Commission two questions of procedure appear to me to raise issues of principle.

Suits in the Ecclesiastical Courts are divided into Criminal and Civil Suits. The precise distinction between one kind of suit and the other involves some technical matter, but in substance it conforms to the distinction which the popular meaning of the words suggests. In modern times, at any rate, the criminal jurisdiction has overshadowed the civil jurisdiction completely. So we find in law the doctrine that a criminal suit is always competent if a party finds difficulty in asserting his right in a civil suit, and in fact multitudes of Churchmen are wholly ignorant of the civil jurisdiction save in relation to faculties. The misconceptions which promote the view that the chief function of Ecclesiastical Courts is the "discipline of office-bearers" to which Lord Phillimore refers in his reservation to the Report, are in great measure responsible for the exaltation of the criminal suit over the civil suit. It seems to me, for the reasons hereafter set forth, that nothing is more necessary in the reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts than the redressing of the balance in this matter; the revival and simplification of the civil procedure; and the discouragement, if not the prohibition, of criminal suits, when the matter in dispute is not in truth criminal.

A sense of decency, if nothing else, should promote this reform. It is nothing less than a scandal that no procedure should be competent to compel a lay rector to repair a chancel, except a suit "for his soul's health and for the reformation of his manners" in which the proper conclusion is penance and excommunication. It would be an intolerable scandal if the proper conclusion were not, in fact, avoided by the "back-doors" of Monition and Significavit, but the "back-doors" notwithstanding, the use of a criminal suit for this and the like purposes is discreditable to the Church and objectionable in practice.*

There are, however, practical reasons which urgently support the necessity of this reform. In the course of a year a considerable number of legal questions are referred to every

* Not long ago a question arose between a diocesan bishop and a layman as to the user of property alleged to be consecrated. The layman was a Roman Catholic. The point in issue was a proper one for decision in the Ecclesiastical Courts; indeed, it could only be raised indirectly, if at all, in the Civil Courts. But the only competent ecclesiastical procedure was a criminal suit against the layman "for his soul's health." What would have been said if the bishop had so impleaded a Roman Catholic?

diocesan Chancellor, either by the bishop or by the parochial clergy through the registrar of the diocese. Many of these relate to matters of administration involving no dispute, and can be readily answered. A minority arise out of a manifest dispute or difference of opinion, and sometimes they are far from easy to answer. The necessity of interpreting the measures passed by the Assembly and, I may add, the Law of Property Act and kindred Acts daily add to the number and complexity of the questions asked. The Chancellor may, of course, refuse to answer a particular conundrum, but, short of this drastic course, he can only do his best in the absence of any assistance. He cannot require the question to be argued, though argument may be highly desirable, and though it may be manifest that there are two parties to the dispute, both thirsting to argue it. There cannot be a much worse way of deciding matters than this. The decision or opinion is given in secret; the party who has sought it may know the Chancellor's reasons, the other party almost invariably does not. He may know vaguely that the Chancellor's opinion is against him, but he will get little comfort from that. If this procedure becomes a permanent part of the machinery of the Church of England, a companion volume to Maitland's work will be required entitled *Administrative Law in the Church of England.*

It appears to me that a civil procedure of the utmost simplicity is required under which questions could be speedily and cheaply determined, and under which a Chancellor could require disputes of difficulty referred to him to be argued and determined. The procedure should encourage to the utmost the making of admissions of fact, and indeed proceeding by case stated if possible. The judgment would be of a declaratory nature, and would not, in that suit, be enforceable by any penalties whatever. If it were desired to test the Chancellor's opinion by appeal or prohibition, a case stated is, as every lawyer knows, the most suitable form for such a proceeding. Having established such a procedure, I would expressly make it applicable to the interpretation of rubrics and the like, and to ceremonial disputes generally so that persons who really desired to ascertain the law and not to persecute their opponents, and persons of sufficient charity to believe that their opponents would willingly obey the law when it was determined by Courts in which confidence has been restored, could proceed civilly and not criminally.

Incidentally the existence of an alternative civil procedure would go far to solve the question of the bishop's veto. There would be no veto in regard to civil suits; there would be an absolute veto as to criminal suits. No one could then com-

plain that he was unable to obtain a decision as to what the law is; while, on the other hand, anyone wishing to proceed criminally would have to show an overwhelming case, or that the decision in a civil suit had been wholly disregarded.

Moreover, such a procedure as I have suggested seems absolutely essential as the complement to the procedure proposed by the Commission for referring disputes to the bishop for decision by "administrative action." They admit that some cases cannot properly be so dealt with, and that the bishop must have power to refuse to act. Suppose such a case, the bishop would be driven in effect to say this to the parties: "You have referred your dispute to me, thereby manifesting a desire that it may be determined as amicably as possible, and without subjecting either of you to the possibility of penalty or censure. But your dispute raises a serious question of law, which it would not be proper for me to determine here. I refer you to my Consistory Court. There one of you must bring a criminal suit against the other, the object of which is that that other shall be put to penance, excommunicated, deprived or even deposed. You must carry in Articles, Responsive Allegations, and the like, and perform all the formalities of a criminal suit which will put both of you to considerable expense. The very fact that you have sought to refer your dispute to me shows that you wish to do none of these things. That I cannot help. The Church of England in its wisdom, and notwithstanding that it is pledged to seek peace and ensue it, provides no alternative procedure."

The Commission has clearly pointed that the first duty of a Christian community is to avoid litigation. When, however, litigation is inevitable, is it not equally its duty to insure that such litigation shall be no more penal or oppressive than is absolutely necessary? Does not the exaltation of the criminal suit at the expense of the civil inculcate the opposite principle? There is no law against charity, even in litigation.

I have said that this question arises out of the Report, but it so arises because the Commission has made no recommendation on the subject, which nevertheless appears to me to be wellnigh the most important matter in regard to the reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, the creation of a new Final Court of Appeal only excepted.

The Commissioners have, however, made one startling recommendation as to procedure which is contained in paragraph 62 of the Report. The paragraph, with two additions, is taken bodily from the Report of the Commission of 1881, and perhaps this fact may support an inference that the matter did not receive such full consideration from the recent Com-

mission as otherwise it might have received. A new body, in no sense an ecclesiastical body or representing the authority of the episcopate, but approximating to, without exactly being, a Committee of the Privy Council, is proposed which shall prescribe the whole practice and procedure of the Ecclesiastical Courts. The fact that the archbishops and one or two bishops, the Officials Principal of the Provincial Courts and one Chancellor are members of this body does not, I need hardly say, make it an organ of the episcopate any more than the addition of episcopal members to the Judicial Committee made the latter a spiritual Court. In a report concerned to vindicate the spiritual character of the Ecclesiastical Courts this recommendation is astounding, and one would suppose that practical arguments of an urgent character would be adduced in support of it. No arguments of any kind in support of it are, in fact, to be found in the Report.

The present position is shortly as follows: When Parliament has intervened, as in the Public Worship Regulation Act, the Clergy Discipline Act, and the Benefices Act, to regulate proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts, provision has been made for prescribing statutory rules as to procedure, and the practice of one Court—that of London—has been regulated in the same kind of way by a Special Act. Under all these Acts rules have, in fact, been made of great elaboration and much detail. I am far from making an attack upon them. They bear a considerable resemblance to the Rules of the Supreme Court and other manuals of practice in the Civil and Criminal Courts, and it is not an impossible view that they are not in all respects particularly well adapted to the needs of the Ecclesiastical Courts. Apart from these statutory interventions, the practice of Consistory Courts has from time immemorial been regulated by the Chancellor with the assent of the bishop. This is notably the case in regard to the faculty jurisdiction. And this power has not been allowed to become rusty from disuse. The procedure in faculty cases has been reformed, modernized and simplified in many dioceses in the last thirty years, though the reforms have not, it is true, been uniform in all dioceses. The faculty jurisdiction has never been regulated by statute. Why the present should be a suitable occasion for depriving the bishops and their officials of their ancient authority passes my comprehension. A good deal of the practice of the Consistory Courts is unwritten and of extreme antiquity. I am far from clear that to reduce it all into the form of statutory rules and abolish, as such rules must, all local variations, will be to the general advantage. The Church of England never sat more lightly to the principle of uniformity than it does now, and I

share the fears recently expressed by the Bishop of Durham of excessive centralization and of the loss by the dioceses of their reasonable autonomy. Indeed, the proposed "standardization" of practice, and the abolition of old forms and customs which would necessarily follow irresistibly reminds me of the "restoration" and "modernization" of ancient churches in the early nineteenth century which we all now deplore.

It will be said, however, that the whole practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts is in need of overhaul, and that greater uniformity in the dioceses is, to some extent at least, desirable. I agree. But I know no reason why the Church should be incapable of doing this work for itself. If the vagaries of individual Chancellors and bishops are in need of control, surely the whole body of Chancellors and the Upper Houses of Convocation are the proper bodies to exercise it. Why should not the rule-making power be vested in the body of Chancellors or their standing Committee subject to the approval of the houses of bishops? Is this not preferable to a bureaucratic committee devoid of canonical status? Paragraph 62 implies that no Chancellor, save the Chancellor of London, could by possibility have a suggestion of value to contribute. Is not this, perhaps, a little unkind?

Moreover, the proposed committee would only come into existence when the reforming measures are passed, which is far too late. A thorough but conservative reform of the practice of the Courts might and should be undertaken now, so as to be complete when the reformed system of Courts comes into operation. I would plead for the prompt appointment of a Commission reinforced by whatever outside legal talent may be thought necessary, to consider the reform of practice and procedure, and the bodies by which it shall in future be regulated. I think such a Commission would not disdain to consider suggestions made by the diocesan Chancellors, and I hope it would carefully weigh the arguments against the prescription of practice and procedure in the future by such a body as the recent Commission has suggested.

ALAN LESLIE.

ESSAYS CATHOLIC AND CRITICAL: A SYMPOSIUM

I.—By Monseigneur P. Batiffol

Tous ceux qui parmi nous savent par expérience ce que c'est que d'être "brought into close touch with the vigorous currents of thought and feeling amid which Christianity has to render its own life and truth explicit," comme dit M. Selwyn (p. v), accueilleront avec intérêt, avec sympathie, les *Essays Catholic and Critical.* Ils n'y trouveront pas abordés tous les problèmes que l'heure présente pose à leur foi, mais seulement l'étude d'un petit nombre de questions, qui à vrai dire sont choisies parmi les plus décisives, et ils auront le plaisir de voir cette étude conduite avec une critique scrupuleuse. Nous estimons trop cette méthode et cette attitude pour ne pas accepter l'invitation que l'éditeur de la revue Theology nous a adressée de dire notre pensée sur ces *Essays.*

On n'attend pas de moi un examen détaillé de chacun des treize *Essays.* Je ne parlerai que de quelques uns, en exprimant la satisfaction qu'ils me donnent, ou les réserves qu'ils m'inspirent.

* * * * *

L'étude de M. James, *Emergence of Religion,* nous confirmerait, s'il était besoin, dans la disposition où nous sommes de n'opposer aux certitudes de la science aucune fin de non recevoir théologique. L'anthropologie est une science jeune. Il n'est pas indifférent de noter que plus d'une de ses découvertes les plus marquantes sont dues à des ecclésiastiques, par exemple la découverte de La Chapelle-aux-Saints par M. l'abbé Bouyssonie. Nous n'hésitons pas à accorder à l'ancienneté de l'homme tout le recul que l'anthropologie réclame, et c'est l'exemple que donnait tout récemment encore en France l'éminent géologue qu'est le professeur Termier. L'histoire reçue des origines de l'humanité en est bouleversée, assurément: nous prenons acte de ce bouleversement, nous y ajustons notre enseignement, comme fait M. James. Ce qu'il estime que l'or doit tenir pour acquis sur la religion de l'homme fossile nous semble à nous aussi acquis. Il est même possible que l'école d'ethnologie religieuse, dont le P. Pinard et le P. Schmidt sont chez nous les représentants les plus en vue, accorde davantage à la méthode comparative. Quant à la révélation primitive, ce n'est pas à l'anthropologie que nous demandons de nous en instruire: notre foi dans la vocation surnaturelle de l'humanité n'est ni confirmée, ni infirmée, par l'anthropologie préhistorique, comme le dit très bien M. James (p. 6-7).

* * * * *

M. Taylor, dans son étude *The Vindication of Religion,* a pris soin de rappeler (p. 32) que le concile du Vatican professe que "the existence of God can be demonstrated by natural reason." Ce n'est pas exactement la teneur du canon II, 1, de la constitution *Dei filius,* qui porte que Dieu peut être connu avec certitude par le spectacle de l'univers: *Deum . . . per ea quæ facta sunt naturali rationis lumine certo cognosci . . . posse.* Le concile ne s'est pas servi du verbe *demonstrari,* mais du verbe *cognosci,* la

nuance n'est pas négligeable. Mais il est très vrai que le concile vise et condamne l'agnosticisme. Le concile n'exclut pas les preuves morales de l'existence de Dieu, bien qu'il n'en parle pas, et on ne peut pas dire qu'il récuse les preuves dites de l'expérience religieuse, dont la légitimité n'est pas contestée parmi nous, à condition que leur emploi ne soit pas exclusif. Le concile se réfère à la doctrine de S. Paul: le concile tirent pour une connaissance certaine de Dieu, connaissance rationnelle, connaissance naturelle, dont tout homme est capable en vertu de sa nature (même après la Chûte) et sans l'intervention de la grâce. C'est bien ainsi, je pense, que l'entend M. Taylor.

Il est vrai que cette connaissance certaine, rationnelle, naturelle de Dieu, n'est pas strictement la religion: le premier moteur est et n'est pas le Père céleste: la personnalité de Dieu, ou, comme on aime à dire, le caractère de Dieu, est objet de foi, c'est à dire un élément révélé. La connaissance du révélé, la foi, a ceci de très particulier que l'assentiment de notre esprit y est libre. Les vérités géométriques ne nous laissent pas la liberté de leur refuser notre assentiment: les vérités de foi sont connues par nous de telle sorte qu'elles nous laissent cette liberté. Et cette liberté de l'intelligence, dans un assentiment qui d'ailleurs n'est pas aveugle, mais est motivé par les raisons de croire, et peut aussi être confirmé par l'intelligibilité du donné révélé, cette liberté de l'intelligence, dis je, est spécifique de la foi et la différencie de la connaissance naturelle. Nous devons au concile du Vatican d'avoir très fermement défendu cette liberté de l'intelligence, d'avoir sauvegardé ainsi la coopération de la grâce à la foi, d'avoir écarté toute confusion possible entre la foi et le fidéisme: *Si quis dixerit assensum fidei christianae non esse liberum, sed argumentis humanae rationis necessario produci, anathema sit* (can. III., 5). Mais il est clair que cet assentiment libre n'est pas assimilable à la connaissance scientifique, c'est entendu, mais pas davantage à une simple " interprétation des suggestions de la vie." Me trompé-je en disant que le révélé n'entre pas dans la perspective de M. Taylor ?

* * * * *

M. Rawlinson a dit très bien que le caractère essentiel du christianisme est que " it claims to be a religion of revelation, and as such to proclaim to mankind an authoritative Gospel in the name of the living God " (p. 86). L'Eglise a reçu cet Evangile, c'est à dire le message que le Christ a apporté à l'humanité, elle l'a reçu pour le prêcher et pour le maintenir, et elle est " an authoritative society, in so far as it is entrusted with an authoritative message " (p. 89), mais l'autorité de l'Eglise ne saurait être de même nature que l'autorité de l'Evangile, " the divine message of revelation," car l'Eglise n'a pas mission de rien révéler, et elle peut dire seulement: *Quod didici doceo.* Cependant, dans cette prédication et dans cette conservation du divin message révélé, nous admettons, et M. Rawlinson avec nous, que l'Eglise soit " empowered with divine authority to proclaim it " (p. 89).

Assurément, il y a dans l'Eglise différentes espèces d'autorité, mais nous ne nous permettons pas de dire qu'elles sont toutes exposées à devenir abusives, " all liable to abuse, because of the frailty of men and of the earthen vessels to which the divine treasure is committed " (p. 89). Nous croyons que, pour autant qu'elle a à préserver le dépot de la foi, l'Eglise a la promesse d'être infaillible et que cette infaillibilité lui est assurée par

l'assistance de Dieu. S'il en était autrement, la revendication par l'Eglise de l'autorité qu'elle exerce sur ses fidèles depuis l'origine serait une usurpation manifeste et intolérable, et le Protestantisme serait justifié.

M. Rawlinson écrit (p. 93): " The writers of this volume are united in the conviction that the claims made in this respect for the Papacy are in point of fact untrue." A notre tour ne sommes-nous pas en droit de demander à M. Rawlinson: Accordez-vous à l'Eglise en tant que telle une infaillibilité quelconque ? A-t-elle le droit d'imposer une *lex credendi?* M. Rawlinson me répondra que " the fundamental authority which lies behind the teaching of the Church is the authority of revelation, in the form of the (primarily prophetic) message of the Gospel, which the Church is divinely commissioned to proclaim " (p. 97), et que le reste de l'énseignement dogmatique de l'Eglise est théologie et n'a d'autre valeur que celle de " conclusions of a genuinely free consensus of competent and adequately Christian minds " (p. 96). Le Catholicisme ne se reconnaîtra pas dans cette simplification.

De fait, M. Rawlinson rejette ce qu'il reproche à la Papauté de vouloir être, c'est à savoir " an external and oracular guarantee," et cela est l'infaillibilité, et il ajoute aussitot: " Neither the oracular conception of the authority of the Bible, nor that of the authority of the ecumenical Councils and Creeds, is in a position to survive the rejection of the oracular conception of the authority of the Pope " (p. 99). Toute autorité donc est congédiée, et M. Rawlinson en convient bien quand il déclare que " the final authority is not anything which is either mechanical or merely external, but is rather the intrinsic and self-evidencing authority of truth " (p. 95).

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Avec M. Knox et son essay *The Authority of the Church,* nous serons plus facilement d'accord.

Comme lui, in effet, nous dénonçons la prétention de la Réforme à voir dans la Bible " the only source of authority for the teaching and practice of the Church." Ce paradoxe a servi aux Réformateurs à s'émanciper de l'autorité du Catholicisme de leur temps, " but the claim that the Bible alone is the final and sufficient guide for Christian belief and morality was entirely untenable " (p. 99). De fait, les Réformateurs en appelaient à la Bible en tant qu'interprétée par chacun d'eux: ils se substituaient eux-mêmes à la Bible. Aujourd'hui, les protestants ont renoncé à reconnaître la souveraineté de la Bible. Qui voudra se rendre compte du désenchantement protestant n'aura qu'à lire les *Grundfragen einer Einigung der Kirche Christi* (1925) publiés par Harnack, Deissmann, Juelicher, Loofs, Kaftan, et autres théologiens de premier plan du Protestantisme universitaire allemand, comme contribution a la conférence de Stockholm de l'an passé.

Nous ne dissimulons par pour autant les difficultés que nous trouvons à justifier le dogme de l'inspiration et la théologie de l'inerrance scripturaire. M. Knox en dit un mot (p. 101), car ces difficultés existent pour lui comme pour nous. Elles nous font apprécier davantage le refuge que notre foi trouve dans les points fixés par l'Eglise et dans le divin message qu'elle a reçu mission de conserver au monde.

Ce sont et ce message et les vérités impliquées dans ce message que l'Eglise a mission de maintenir. Ici nous nous séparons de M. Knox. Il croit à une expérience religieuse de l'Eglise et il voit dans cette expérience

religieuse le criterium des vérités catholiques: " The function of authority in the Church is to formulate and render explicit, where need arises, truth implied in the spiritual experience of the Christian consciousness " (p. 112). Nous ne pensons pas que cette vue soit justifiable.

Assurément, il est arrivé souvent que la dévotion sensible des fidèles a devancé et préparé les définitions dogmatiques de l'autorité. Ainsi S. Augustin fait valoir, comme preuve du péché originel, l'empressement des mères qui courent à l'église pour faire baptiser leurs enfants à peine nés. Mais les définitions de l'autorité interviennent plus souvent pour confirmer les inférences des controversistes: c'est le cas du consubstantiel nicéen ou du diphysisme chalcédonien, par exemple. La fonction de l'autorité dans l'Eglise est de formuler et d'expliciter les vérités contenues dans le dépot de la foi, de maintenir la connaissance du révélé et des vérités qu'il implique ou qu'il postule.

Il n'est pas exact de dire que, dans les trois premiers siècles, " it was mainly due to the general religious sense of the Christian community that the entirely destructive heresies were eliminated from the Church " (p. 106). Ces hérésies ont été éliminées au nom de la régle de foi, et la régle de foi a été imposée et maintenue par l'épiscopat. L'autorité dans chaque communauté chrétienne était représentée par l'évêque, et, quand il fallait concerter une action commune, par les évêques réunis en synodes. On promulguait la foi à titre de foi apostolique, et cette foi était imposée comme une loi, *lex credendi*, sans attendre que les fidèles consentissent à s'y rallier. Plus tard, les grands conciles sont venus et ont procédé de même; l'opposition des Ariens ou des Monophysites n'a pas fait efficacement échec à la promulgation de Nicée ou de Chalcédoine, si tenace qu'ait été cette opposition. M. Knox écrit que " the falsehood of rival forms of teaching was proved by their disappearance " (p. 107). C'est là un principe bien contestable !

Nous professons que l'infaillibilité de l'Eglise réside dans l'universalité de ses évêques, y compris la pape qui est la tête du corps. A quoi M. Knox objecte que l'on ne sait jamais clairement si cette infaillibilité s'est prononcée: " Thus in fact the mere nature of the authority which utters a decision, whether Pope or Council, is by itself of no value as a test of infallibility " (p. 112). M. Knox oublie qu'un concile ne devient œcuménique que par l'adhésion de l'universalité des évêques, comme ce fut en fin de compte le cas de Nicée, ou par la confirmation du Siége apostolique, comme ce fut le cas de Chalcédoine et des conciles ultérieurs. Je dis: l'universalité des évêques, je dis: le Pape, et je crois que ces deux organes sont plus facilement discernibles que " the general Christian consciousness " ou " the devotional experience of the Church " (p. 113), invoquées par M. Knox.

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On ne sera pas surpris que j'aie lu avec un intérêt plus vif encore la note de M. Knox (pp. 116-118), *The Holy Roman Church*, qui se rattache étroitement à un sujet que nous avons traité dans les conversations de Malines.

Cette note s'ouvre par une déclaration nette et hardie: " Anglicans have tended in the past to a rather facile depreciation of the claims of the See of Peter." De notre côté, nous sommes tout disposés à oublier le temps où le pape était par les Anglicans identifié avec l'Antechrist, et

pareillement le temps ou certains canonistes de la fin du moyen age traitaient le pape de Dieu ! Ces temps sont heureusement abolis.

La rupture de l'Occident et de l'Orient a obscurci la notion de l'unité du Catholicisme qui s'était réalisée dans l'antiquité chrétienne sous l'égide du Siége apostolique. M. Knox nous assure qu'il y a "an element of truth in that devotion to the Holy See which has done so much to preserve the Catholic faith in Western Europe." J'aurais souhaité qu'il dépassât l'horizon de l'Occident et qu'il essayât de dégager l'elément de vérité que contenait la dévotion de l'Orient lui-même. Me permettra-t-il de lui signaler l'étude que j'ai publiée sur *Justinien et le Siége apostolique*, dans le fascicule de juillet 1926 de la revue *Recherches religieuses?* La Réforme purement occidentale du XI^me^ siècle a fait de la papauté une institution politique et canonique que l'antiquité chrétienne n'a pas connue telle: nous avons à dégager la papauté antique de cette construction contingente, si nous voulons réconcilier avec Rome les Orients orthodoxes.

Nous sommes très heureux de voir M. Knox reconnaitre que S. Pierre a tenu une place privilégiée dans la primitive Eglise et que les "Petrine claims" sont un développement de la mission que S. Pierre a reçue du Christ.

M. Knox pose une alternative. Toute la question, écrit-il, est de savoir si la papauté doit être regardée "as the organ through which the Holy Ghost speaks directly to the whole Church," et je n'ai pas besoin de dire que ces termes ne sont ceux d'aucun théologien romain—ou si la papauté est "the organ for articulating the experience of the Christian body as a whole, that experience being produced by the influence of the Holy Ghost on the corporate consciousness of the Church," et aucun théologien romain ne se reconnaitra dans ces termes. "At the present time," écrit M. Knox, "it is impossible to say which of these conceptions is the true one from the Roman point of view." A quoi je réponds que ni l'un, ni l'autre, des deux termes de l'alternative n'exprime la doctrine du concile du Vatican.

Je veux espérer que, en dépit des particularités de son langage, M. Knox n'est pas loin de penser comme nous. Il demande que l'Eglise, dans la perspective d'une réunion avec Rome des Eglises séparées, soit garantie contre les outrances d'une centralisation monarchique. Nous ne nous scandalisons par d'une pareille demande. Et nous nous réjouissons quand il ajoute: "Such a rejection of autocratic claims need not involve the rejection of the view that Papacy has a special function to fulfil in the life of the Church." Nous nous réjouissons davantage encore de lire cette déclaration, qui sera certainement très remarquée:

"Just as the authority of the episcopate is held to be *de iure divino* on the ground that by a process of legitimate development the episcopate has become the repository of the authority given to the Apostles, so it might be held that the Papacy possesses authority *de iure divino* as having become by a similar process the repository of a primacy held by St. Peter."

Pareille déclaration est de nature à rapprocher plus qu'on n'a réussi à faire encore le point de vue anglo-catholique et le point de vue romain. Sans doute, il reste à déterminer la primauté de responsabilité qui depuis l'apotre Pierre se perpétue dans la papauté, mais il est clair que si cette primauté n'est pas le pur produit de l'histoire, ni même simplement providentielle au sens où providentiel est synonyme d'accidentel, mais une d'institution divine au même titre que l'épiscopat, l'unité est bien près d'être rétablie.

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Le Catholicisme est dogmatique, hiérarchique et sacramentaire: ce sont les trois notes qui le différencient essentiellement du Protestantisme moderne. Par là s'explique, en particulier, l'animosité de ce Protestantisme contre notre sacramentalisme et que nul terme ne semble exciter davantage M. Harnack, par exemple, que le mot *opus operatum*. Le protestant authentique se reconnait toujours à la prétention d'être sauvé *fide sola*. M. Williams a consacré son essai, *The Origins of the Sacraments*, à une apologie de notre sacramentalisme, plus précisément, à une démonstration de l'institution des sacrements par le Christ.

Je regrette qui il ait passé si vite sur la question du nombre des sacrements, et qu'il ait en deux mots, à propos de l'ordination, admis qu'elle ne soit pas un *sacramentum evangelicum* (p. 375). L'ordination soulève la question de savoir si tous les sacrements ont été institués par le Christ. Nos théologiens réclament une institution immédiate, mais ils acceptent que les sacrements (le baptême et l'eucharistie mis à part) aient pu être institués par le Christ *in genere*, non *in specie*, de telle sorte que l'Eglise ait reçu le pouvoir d'en déterminer et la matière et la forme. Je ne doute pas que M. Williams connaisse cette ingénieuse controverse aussi bien qu'il connait la controverse sur la causalité des sacrements (p. 372). Qu'il me permette de lui signaler le livre excellent de P. Pourrat, *La théologie sacramentaire* (1906), où, au besoin, il la trouvera exposée. Il nous suffit que le Sauveur ait *in genere* voulu la collation de Saint Esprit (confirmation), le pardon du fidèle pécheur et repentant (pénitence), l'élection et la mission des ministres de la parole (ordination), la sanctification des époux (mariage), le soulagement des malades (extrême onction), pour que ces cinq actes aient la vertu sacramentelle qu'ils n'auraient pas sans lui. Cette théorie paraitra plus acceptable que celle de M. Williams, qui se désintéresse de trois sacrements sur sept, n'en retient que quatre (baptême, confirmation, pénitence, eucharistie), et croit retrouver la pénitence et la confirmation dans le baptême.

Mais voulant démontrer que le Sauveur a institué des sacrements, M. Williams devait concentrer son effort sur le baptême et sur l'eucharistie, les deux sacrements dont le Nouveau Testament parle explicitement: le problème n'est pas simple, M. Williams ne dissimule pas les difficultés, il les expose avec détail, avec lucidité, sans minimiser leur gravité, soit dans l'hypothèse de l'Evangile eschatologique qui était à la mode voici vingt ans, soit dans l'hypothèse de l'influence des religious à mystères sur le christianisme naissant, qui est l'hypothèse présentement en faveur auprès de tant de nos contemporains. La discussion de M. Williams est admirablement conduite.

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On attachera une importance grande à un dernier essai, celui de M. Spens, *The Eucharist*, comme affirmation du sacrifice eucharistique.

M. Spens dit très bien: " All our evidence makes it clear that the rite at the Last Supper was connected by the closest ties with that sacrifice of Christ upon the cross which was so soon to be consummated " (p. 431). Il me semble qu'il manque un élément capital à la théorie de M. Spens, c'est l'idée d'oblation: la victime ne suffit pas, l'immolation ou destruction de la victime ne suffit pas, il faut que la victime immolée soit offerte à Dieu par le prêtre. Telle est la signification que nous donnons à la célébration de la cène par le Sauveur: il présente son corps et son sang à

l'état d'immolation, il en fait un sacrifice, anticipant sacramentellement l'immolation de la croix. La messe est une oblation que nous faisons à Dieu, au nom du Sauveur et par son commandement, de son corps et de son sang, exactement comme le Sauveur a fait à la cène, non plus par anticipation, mais par représentation sacramentelle de l'immolation de la croix. A la cène le Christ a offert son immolation, à la messe il l'offre par la délégation qu'il en a donnée à ses apôtres et à leurs successeurs. Nous ne disons donc pas que, dans notre liturgie, "His death is proclaimed, before God and man, as an expiatory sacrifice" (p. 437), nous disons que l'oblation est renouvelée que le Sauveur a faite à la cène de son immolation sur la croix.

Telle est la théorie du P. de la Taille. Voyez son *Esquisse du mystère de la Foi* (1924). J'avais moi-même esquissé une théorie pareille dans mes *Leçons sur la Messe* (1918), et le P. de la Taille a bien voulu le rappeler. M. Spens, avant de connaître l'œuvre du théologien jésuite, s'est trouvé l'avoir pressentie et devancée. Les éclaircissements auxquels nous arrivons ainsi sur l'essence du sacrifice de la messe dissiperont bien des nuages, bien des confusions, sans diminuer la dévotion de personne.

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Arrêtons-là ces notes que nous avons mises comme en marge de tels et tels de ces essais: arrêtons-nous avec le regret de ne rien dire de tels autres, dont l'intérêt n'est pas moindre, ainsi l'essai *The Spirit and the Church in History* de M. Milner-White, ou l'essai *The Reformation* de M. Thompson. Nous fermons le beau volume publié par M. Selwyn avec l'impression que tous les essais qu'il contient, si divers, si actuels, témoignent d'une théologie qui se cherche.

La théologie, dont Harnack, dans ses *Thoughts on the Present Position of Protestantism* (trad. angl. par B. Saunders, 1899), a célébré le déclin et déclaré: "Now it is pushed into the background, or else the work which it performs is described as a *quantité négligeable*, as a barren and unpractical element in the service of the Church" (p. 27), la théologie apparait comme la pensée de l'Eglise, et cette pensée, on sent le besoin de la redécouvrir, de la vérifier, de l'organiser, mais on réalise que cette pensée est solidaire de la tradition catholique. Dans la revue THEOLOGY, 1926, p. 54, nous avons beaucoup remarqué l'article de M. Harris félicitant M. Relton de défendre la doctrine chalcédonienne des deux natures et souhaitant qu'il compose un traité de l'Incarnation au courant des discussions christologiques de ces vingt cinq dernières années. Et il ajoute: "At present there is great need of a satisfactory treatise dealing with the present-day situation from the Catholic standpoint. . . ." J'abrège la citation, qui vaudrait cependant la peine d'être relevée tout entière.

Cette recherche d'une théologie qui rejoigne et continue la tradition catholique est le spectacle captivant que nous trouvons dans ces *Essays Catholic and Critical*, comme dans tout l'effort doctrinal de l'Anglocatholicism. Assurément les collaborateurs de cette œuvre avancent en ordre dispersé, mais leur objectif est unique: ils vont à la restauration de l'autorité dans la vérité. Si j'ai noté bien des divergences entre ces *Essays* et la théologie romaine, ce n'est pas que je renonce à voir ces divergences s'atténuer et l'entente se rapprocher, en quoi je reste et veux rester fidèle à l'esprit de Malines.

II.—By Dr. Anderson Scott

With what has been said and yet will be said as to the interest and importance of this volume I should like cordially to associate myself. The recognized scholarship of the several contributors and their position as representatives of an influential school of thought make a strong claim upon attention, and the claim is substantiated by the way in which they for the most part have executed their task. And the task is nothing less than an attempt to exhibit a synthesis between modern criticism and philosophy and the Catholic interpretation of Christianity.

An adequate estimation of the work would include an appreciation of the several essays as independent contributions to the subjects treated of, and also an examination of the work as a whole in its bearing on one or other of the problems presently confronting us. On some of the essays it would be presumptuous for me to express any critical opinion. But I may be permitted to express admiration and gratitude for Professor A. E. Taylor's essay on The Vindication of Religion, which by itself would give distinction to the volume. By putting feeling and conscience into the exposition of arguments which are not themselves unfamiliar, he has given them a force and persuasiveness which should bring conviction to many. It is perhaps inevitable that the two essays on Authority for all their candour and penetration should leave unanswered the question as it presents itself to the ordinary man, What and where is the authority which I cannot but obey? It would have been well, perhaps, to make clear that authority of that kind is definitely ruled out of the method of Christ: "There shall no sign be given it," no external manifestation of power, by which men (as they imagine) will be compelled to believe. It is all to the good that Mr. Rawlinson rejects "oracular" authority of every kind, whether claimed for Scripture, for Creed, or for Papacy. What remains is "persuasive" authority due to the converging witness of conscience, Scripture, and the Church. And in this field the authority of the Church's teaching goes far beyond the curiously negative claim which is made for it by Mr. Wilfred Knox, "to delimit the Christian faith from other religions and to rule out lines of speculation which were seen, or instinctively felt, to be fatal to the presuppositions on which the religious experience of the Christian body rested." In this description he seems to have been guided too exclusively by forms of teaching which found expression through the great Councils. It stands to the credit of the Churches of the Reformation that they at least tried, through the expression in confessional form of "the consensus of competent and adequately Christian minds," to put the stamp of Church authority upon the positive doctrines of redemption. If Mr. Knox fails to satisfy the enquiring mind, it is because he has not dealt adequately at least with two of the three questions he propounds (p. 98). These are questions vital for the "Catholic." For the rest of us, the vital question is, Where and in whom resides authority corresponding to that exercised by the Lord, authority which was *not* like that of the Scribes, but by which men were *persuaded* to believe?

The next essay, on The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels, should bring us to the heart of the matter and provide the starting-point and foundation for those which follow. And it is with genuine disappointment that I fail to find it doing so. So far as it goes it is excellent. The "Liberal

Protestant" reconstruction of the portrait of Jesus (is it confined to Protestants ?) is described with accuracy and vigour. The sketch of Synoptic Criticism which follows is admirably lucid; the section on Governing Ideas of the Gospels fresh and interesting. And then, when we look for, and surely have a right to expect, a positive reconstruction in the light of the criticism and of these governing ideas, we find we are at the end. Formally, it might fairly be said that the Liberal Protestant solution is left holding the field. At least, there is nothing to put in its place. And the gap is really serious. The thoughtful reader must be conscious of it, more and more, as he reads on. The Resurrection, the Atonement, the Church, and the problem of Incarnation all demand or assume a Christ who is other than the Figure left to us by the "Liberal Protestant" solution, a Christ who is, as many of us still believe, the Christ of the Synoptic Gospels. He is one on whom His followers believed with a self-committing faith of the same quality as the faith men have in God. Without assuming any right or power to decide *a priori* how the Son of God would comport Himself "in human flesh," we have the right to ask and the means to discover how He did comport Himself so that men "believed on him." Neither Dr. Mozley nor the Editor nor even Mr. N. P. Williams can do without such faith in such a Person, antecedent to the Crucifixion. To do justice to the subject, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns might have required as much space again. But it would have been worth while.

Dr. Mozley starts from other premises than those provided by this essay, "the recognition of a mystery *sui generis* about the Person of Jesus." He enters certain not negligible caveats against a too summary rejection of the Chalcedonian Formula; but it is on pp. 185 and 198 that he comes to the heart of the matter. There is about Chalcedon something incurably academic and scholastic. And the secure and satisfying conviction of the Church is that any man with a sense of moral responsibility and moral inadequacy so rightly stressed by Professor Taylor, who takes Christ seriously, will ultimately find no language except the confession of St. Thomas adequate to express his experience. It is with a conclusion of a similar kind that we lay down the Editor's interesting contribution on the Resurrection of Christ. I confess to being numbered among those who are not helped by "the view that regards the Appearances as analogous to the mystical experiences of the saints." Neither is much gained by the substitution of "veridical" for "objective" as characterizing some "visions," and possibly the visions which His followers had of Christ. If "veridical" means having an external reality corresponding to what is mentally perceived, then we have simply the old problem under a new name. And the Easter experience of the disciples appears to lose rather than to gain in impressiveness and persuasive power by being ranked with the visions of later saints following on a long process of psychological and devotional preparation. What is recorded in these narratives may be what the disciples felt must have happened in order to account for their vivid consciousness of having seen Him alive, in order to convey their irrefragable conviction that He had triumphed over death. And the evidence for that conviction is more widely spread and more impressive than Mr. Selwyn allows himself to show, including indirect evidence which is perhaps more striking than the direct. The Letters to the Seven Churches bear eloquent testimony, and Matt. xxviii. 20, if no longer available for one purpose, is of great value for another.

If it seems somewhat bold in Mr. Kenneth Kirk to take a well-known

children's hymn for the framework of his essay on the Atonement, he is abundantly justified by the result. He seems to me to "disquiet himself in vain" about St. Paul's doctrine of justification (p. 271). No doubt it involves a forensic conception "redolent of the Law," but Mr. Kirk has himself pointed out its subordinate position and its limited application in the Apostle's system of thought compared with the sovereign and comprehensive character of "reconciliation." And "the Gospel phrase of *forgiveness*," which he is said to have discarded, represented as it is by ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, belongs to the field of "forensic" ideas as definitely as "reconciliation" does not. The real problem is rather the converse of what Mr. Kirk feels; why do the direct Gospel references to "forgiveness" stop short at "remission of sins," and why is it left to St. Paul to combine with these the indirect teaching of the Parable of the Prodigal in his doctrine of a reconciliation which presupposes or carries with it "not reckoning unto them their trespasses"? But this is an exegetical point of small importance in the broad, steady exposition of the Evangelical doctrine of reconciliation which Mr. Kirk has given us, and for which all of us must be grateful.

Up to this point the Essays have been "critical" rather than specifically "Catholic." And looking on them from the standpoint of Reformation Theology, there is but little to which criticism could be offered, while there is much which, from the same standpoint, claims hearty appreciation. And it is important to register this broad basis of agreement upon the central verities of the faith. One cannot but regret that the fact is to a large extent obscured, inevitably perhaps, because of the double meaning of the word "Catholic," and the subconscious inclination to claim for what is Catholic in one sense what is equally Catholic in the other.

The non-Catholic reader is conscious of a change of atmosphere when he comes to the essay on the Reformation. It is not that the Reformers and their interpretation of Christianity are criticized or attacked. They are ignored. The Reformation is treated exclusively as a matter between the Papacy and the Crown. The religious aspirations and movement of the time are mentioned only to record their suppression. The Reformation is made to appear as nothing more than the transfer from one form of absolute authority over the Church to another. Yet, apart from the religious and doctrinal aspects of the movement, one would have thought it worth while to chronicle even here the fact that there appeared groups and bodies of people who protested with equal earnestness against Erastianism and Papalism, and for the first time asserted the right Catholic doctrine of the spiritual independence of the Church, "the crown rights of the Lord Jesus," and in maintaining these against Crown and Pope alike, endured untold hardship and suffering.

This indifference to (for one cannot suppose it is ignorance of) the religious experience and the theology of the Reformation, which operates negatively in Mr. Hamilton Thompson's essay, operates positively in that of Mr. N. P. Williams. Writing on the Origin of the Sacraments, he naturally and necessarily deals with their interpretation, and he makes his task of commending the Catholic interpretation only too easy by contrasting it only with the opposite *extreme*, ignoring the intermediate interpretations. It is true that he "does not forget the existence of mediating positions and points of view"; but he does not remember them beyond that sentence. He does not allow either himself or his

readers to realize that it is one or other of these "mediating positions" which finds expression in nearly every confessional document of the Reformed Churches, in the works of their great divines, and in the "consensus of adequately Christian minds" within them to-day; or that the "minimizing" doctrine which he takes as typical of Protestantism is expressly challenged and repudiated in nearly all the authoritative documents of the Reformed Churches. When he insists on taking these "minimizers" as typical of the whole, it is as though a learned biologist, discussing evolution at the British Association, were to brush aside all the variations on Darwin's theory (which represent the living issues of to-day) and confine himself to winning an easy triumph over the pundits of Tennessee. Mr. Williams quotes another of the contributors to this volume as an authority for the statement that in the Protestant Churches the sacraments are but "optional appendages." One would like to know *his* authority for the statement. On the one hand, it would not be difficult, if one accepted the evidence of immature and uninstructed persons, to find "minimizers" elsewhere than within the "Protestant" Churches. On the other hand, most of these Churches have in one form or other proclaimed "the due administration of the sacraments" as one of the (two) marks of the true Church. While, as to the Eucharist, Calvin would have heartily concurred in Mr. Spens's description of it as an "efficacious symbol"; and one document of widespread authority, which happens to be accessible, explains that "the worthy receivers are, not after a corporal or carnal manner, but by faith made partakers of His body and blood, with all His benefits to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace." It is needless to say that one could make a long and impressive catena of authoritative statements to the same effect. And my regret is great that Mr. Williams, after hardly touching the shields of the Protestant knights, seeks in the Socinians foemen worthy of his steel.

At the same time, the deplorable and deplored extreme to which the Socinians were led is largely explained, even if it is not excused, as a revulsion from a use of the sacraments coupled with an underlying theory, such as seems to find favour with Mr. Williams. He appears to include in the sacramental system "the absolution of unconscious persons *in extremis*," which surely involves the assertion of power to affect the relation between God and the individual apart from any spiritual or moral response on his part, an assertion which seems to us to be subversive of any true conception of religion. It is true that on the same page he vigorously denies that "sacramental grace is believed by Catholic Christians to operate irrespectively of the moral dispositions or will of the recipient." And penitence is one of his sacraments! There may be some simple explanation of this apparently flagrant contradiction, but I cannot even guess at it.

Mr. Williams gives us a useful account and criticism of the mystery-religion hypothesis, which I agree with him in thinking to be on the wane. Yet I doubt whether he has taken up the strongest available arguments. He attaches unnecessary importance to the counter-argument from "the eschatologically limited outlook of Christ." For on any interpretation of the Lord's relevant utterances on the subject there has to be some interval between His going and His coming. And a contemplated interval, were it only of weeks, would be quite sufficient to account for His inviting His disciples to call Him to remembrance in a weekly repetition or rehearsal of the Messianic feast. The *religions-geschichtliche* argument that there

is no reliable evidence that Christ did institute the sacraments is very difficult to meet upon the ground selected by those who urge it, the ground of documentary evidence alone. The difficulty becomes only too apparent when we come to Mr. Williams's examination of that evidence. He is entirely candid in dealing with the results of criticism; but it is at the cost of being left with precarious inferences and "probabilities" at best, where his system requires certainty and his opponents demand evidence of a kind that is not forthcoming. There is for me a distressing ambiguity about the phrase "generally necessary for salvation." But taking it in the sense which Mr. Williams appears to give it, I cannot help feeling that dialectically and experimentally it would be much easier to make out a case for the Reformed doctrine of the sacraments than for that which claims to be Catholic.

I have left myself too little space to deal with the book as a whole, whether it be taken as an effort to commend Christianity to the modern man or as an attempted synthesis of the results of modern criticism and philosophy and Catholic thought and worship. In the former aspect it seems to me to lack the keystone, the expected ending of the fifth essay, and to suffer also from the curious passing over of the Apostolic Age, its conception of Christ, of the Holy Spirit, and the Church. The two latter subjects are touched on by Mr. Milner-White. But his essay, eloquent and even moving as it is, leaves most of the crucial questions untouched. From the point of view of a work commending the Catholic system of thought and worship to instructed and thoughtful minds of to-day, I cannot but feel that the problem attempted by Mr. N. P. Williams is not to be solved on these lines; and, what is even more important, there are gaps here also which are serious in what should be a concatenated series. To complete the series and establish the case we should require a full treatment of the Catholic conception of the Church, a similar treatment of the Christian Ministry, and some attempt to show what and where is the effective organ of authority. I confess that I rise from the study of the book with the strong impression that the kind of authority which is demanded and necessitated by the Catholic system is a kind which can ultimately be supplied by the Papacy alone; but it is not the kind of authority which radiates from Christ.

III.—By Sergius Bulgakov

Professor and Archpriest in Paris

In a short statement I can only express the general impression made on an Orthodox theologian by this collective work, in which the generally recognized value of English science is reflected, and which witnesses anew to its strength, richness, and freshness. The collection aspires to be not only a scientific depository, but also "a fresh exposition and defence of the Catholic faith" (Pref.). It appears as an expression of the strong movement in Anglicanism which is directed towards the overcoming of Protestantism, and the revived exposition of the Catholic tradition. The peculiar position of Anglicanism (339, 340, 362, 363, 366), which, on the one hand, frees it from the fetters of Romanism (93), and, on the other, places it face to face with the criticism and hypercriticism of Liberal Protestantism, allows it to formulate certain questions of contemporary theological thought, especially concerning the mutual

relations of scientific criticism and orthodoxy in essence; and this circumstance alone is of a certain value, not only scientific, but also religious. The difficulty of such a task is self-evident. It consists in the fact that "the synthesis of these movements" is not to be sought in the simple comparison of the conclusions of science and the witness of ecclesiastical tradition, as of two synonymous sources of religious knowledge. Ecclesiastical tradition represents truth, although admitting of scientific discovery and the approach to its acceptance; but, strictly speaking, not admitting for itself of scientific proof and investigation into its essence: "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed"; these words of the Saviour, to the Apostle Thomas, refer to the whole content of the faith of the Church. The Church is life in the Holy Spirit, and in this life *all* ecclesiastical tradition finds inward proof, which is confirmed in dogmas, canons, rites, sacraments, divine services, and prayer. The Church always has this immutable, absolute, super-historical basis, which is not established, and is not proved, but at most, is only illuminated from different sides by scientific "criticism." The Church does not close the way to this "criticism," in a certain sense she sanctions it, leaving it free for the scientific inherent discovery of divine truths by human means (and in this respect Orthodoxy gives greater freedom to human scientific research than Roman Catholicism, which gives *ecclesiastical* answers in principle to all scientific-theological questions). However, scientific investigation only acquires *religious* meaning and value when there is such unshakable foundation of teaching in the faith as remains above and beyond a scientific basis, and cannot itself be scientifically established. This relationship of "dogma and criticism" is difficult to find in practice, and the present collection of articles is one of the attempts to find it. It issues from the recognition of the Catholic teaching of tradition which is preserved by ecclesiastical authority by the power of the Holy Spirit dwelling in the Church (see Essay 3, "Authority"; Essay 10, "The Spirit and the Church in History").

In so far as the content of this tradition is revealed in the different articles, the foundation truths of Christian teaching are here professed (the dogmas of the Holy Trinity, the divine humanity of Christ the Saviour, the redemption, the resurrection from the dead, and so forth) as infallible facts of divine revelation.

In the exposition of these truths a generally apologetic consideration is expressed, or an original theological construction is given, demanding special analysis. Such, for example, are the articles 7 "Aspects of Man's Condition"; 8 "The Atonement"; 9 "The Resurrection"; 13 "The Eucharist."

All these articles relate just to the most difficult and complicated questions, on which greater freedom of theological doctrine may be allowed than on other matters which the Church has more exactly defined. From the point of view of the general plan, we must express regret that certain themes are omitted which demand clear definition and are essential to the fundamental object of the compilation—to express the Catholic definition, especially of the nature of the Church (on this there is only an article on the special subject of the "Spirit and the Church in History"), and particularly on the veneration of the Mother of God and its dogmatic significance. Not alone the importance of this question in relation to practical religion, but still more its dogmatic importance, leads one to regret its absence: precisely in it there would be

shown most clearly and evidently the relation between Catholic tradition and criticism. Here chiefly not only "a synthesis" must be sought but also a choice be made between two authorities: the Church and criticism.

The scheme of Old Testament revelation, from the knowledge of God in paradise—through the Fall—preserved by tradition among the patriarchs, continued through the judges and kings, and revealed by the prophets, this Old Testament is the genealogy of Christ the Saviour, and at the same time of the Mother of God (and therefore the doctrine about her is of such principal importance), and is confirmed by ecclesiastical tradition, and therefore should be defended against scientific criticism, whatever be its conclusions. The latter examines the historical ink with which the Old Testament revelation is written, and here it may be allowed the complete freedom of scientific work, which, however, should not be confused with the rationalistic prejudices of the investigators (as is usually done). But it cannot destroy and weaken the tradition of the Church, which depends, moreover, also upon New Testament confirmation—*vetus Testamentum in novo*—and on the whole teaching of the Church. It may, in a certain sense, be said that the narration in the Books of the Bible of the creation of the world and of man, of the Fall, of the Covenant of God with the patriarchs, the exodus from Egypt, of the kings David and Solomon, and so forth, presents not only abstract teaching—*corpus iuris*—but *living religious* reality; and the Christ of the Gospel cannot be separated from the Christ of the Old Testament preparation. And however triumphant in this respect the combat of the critics may appear, they should be, as it were, joined to, expounded by, and subjected to, tradition.

The authors of the articles on New Testament questions: 5 "The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels"; 9 "The Resurrection"; 12 "The Origin of the Sacraments"; 13 "The Eucharist", do this in regard to questions of Gospel criticism, displaying apologetic skill together with scientific seriousness. It is true that in doing this they seem themselves to stand upon critico-historical or naturalistic ground, and sometimes the impression is given that on the solution of critical questions regarding the sources of the Synoptists, or on the analysis of the accounts of the Resurrection, depends our knowledge of these matters. However, it must be supposed that this is a methodological manner or a personal peculiarity of exposition, rather than the point of view of the writers. And in general on questions of New Testament criticism, by reason of the inherent development of knowledge on the subject, the critical danger is past, and the time has come for the purely scientific restoration of its rights to Church tradition, through ignorance of which criticism erred scientifically. At the same time, there naturally came about a disgust for religio-historical representations of Christ according to private taste, cabinet editions of the Gospel according to Harnack, Tolstoy, and others; the spiritual bad taste of such an undertaking is sufficiently self-convicted. But a similar or analogous process with regard to the Old Testament has not yet been completed, and this could not satisfy an Orthodox theologian, so far as it is revealed in this collection. The general point of view expressed in different articles consists in the opinion that "Hebrew monotheism emerged from its origin in more primitive religion (127), out of the dim background, and continues in its progress to exhibit these general characteristics" (124, *cf.* 101-99, 27-28). Such a religio-historical representation of religious "progress" does not fit the frame of Christian

tradition in its Catholic dimension, and presents, in our eyes, an excessive concession to historicism. The same must be said also of the understanding of original sin (7 "Aspects of Man's Condition," 217, 221, 223), according to which the Biblical narrative only preserves the sense of "inspired mythology" (which cannot be disputed), but loses the significance of an historical event, even of one meta-historical (standing on the borders of history), and is resolved into the fog of a Darwinical, psychological, and sociological construction. Church dogma is thought out in massively realistic style, and childish, naïve, realism is closer to it than rationalistic construction.

These critical remarks in no way detract from the generally high, positive appreciation of this collective work of English theologians in its fundamental tendency towards the overcoming in the name of ecclesiastical tradition of Protestantism in its rationalistic narrowness, and also of the confirmation—and this is the most important at the same time—of an honest, free, independent spirit, and in the strength of this, of scientific ecclesiastical thought. Theology and theological science in the Church is not all, and is not even the most essential: however, in our day, and among us in this also true love to Christ and the service of His Church is shown. The consciousness of the unity of the Church is awakening before our eyes, which had been lost in history; voices are sounding which witness to the undying consciousness of this unity,* and to the search for a return to the one ancient universal Church. Having the happiness of belonging from my birth to the universal, Orthodox Church, I feel the gladness of now answering this new voice with brotherly greeting.

IV.—By Dr. Yngve Brilioth

Any foreign student of theology, who tries to form an opinion of the lines of thought that give the Anglican Church of to-day its peculiar stamp and will presumably decide her future history, must feel his indebtedness to the writers in this volume. They have provided him with excellent material on which to base his judgment. And the high intellectual, and partly at least literary, standard of their contributions will help him to understand the real importance of the liberal catholic school of thought. Several of the essays reflect in a remarkable degree that critical honesty, that religious depth, that distinction of personal type, which make this school by far the most interesting and attractive of all the different branches of English theology and churchmanship.

An attempt to follow the course of liberal Catholicism would naturally start from a comparative study of the three collections of essays that mark its progressive way—*Lux Mundi*, *Foundations*, and the present book. This cannot be done here—and such a study would only be a start: it is much to be wished that someone would have the courage to attack the problem. But it is quite certain that a comparative study would show a very real advance, or at any rate development, from, *e.g.*, the more definitely "Catholic" essays in *Foundations*. The late Baron von Hügel used to say that the theology of this book, while satisfactory as far as the Church was concerned, became quite unsatisfactory when it came to the doctrine of God. Without trying to comment on this statement, it may perhaps be safe to say that it could hardly have been made in regard

* Of such are the publications: "Una Sancta," "Irénicon," "Put" (Russian), and the present collection.

to these essays—that we witness here, at least in some of the contributions, a stronger tendency to keep within the margin of traditional theological categories, without excursions in regions of speculative thought that might have incurred the censure of the indefatigable enemy of Pantheism, and even to read the Catholic conception as far as possible into the Bible. This is, however, a point that will shortly be approached from another angle. Hardly less interesting would it be, perhaps, to confront the views of the different writers themselves. If it could be shown that real divergences exist—that would perhaps not be very difficult, *e.g.*, as regards the two writers on the crucial subject of authority, Dr. Rawlinson and Mr. Knox—that would, in my opinion, rather add to the importance of the book and the school it represents, but it would also make it clear that we deal here with a theology in the making, whose solutions can as yet claim to be only preliminary.

The title itself contains a programme and a challenge. Some would deny the compatibility of real Catholicism with a critical outlook. We are here confronted by the daring assertion that they can be reconciled. A reviewer must naturally put the question how far this synthetical experiment has been successful. And an enquiry into the theology of the essays must examine in what proportions the two elements have been combined. It is not, indeed, possible to deal with the two questions—How far Catholic ? How far critical ?—separately. They intertwine in many ways. The Catholic standpoint must always set certain limits for the work of a destructive criticism; on the other hand, the application of the critical principle must be decisive for the selection of those *data* on which constructive Catholicism can build.

It may, however, he expedient to begin with a few remarks upon the critical side of the work. And here it is impossible not to let the first word be a frank recognition of the fairness in stating the critical case, which marks most of the essays, the solid scholarship and wide reading which is apparent, notably in the treatment of biblical matters. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' essay, *The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels*, demonstrates the need for a healthy criticism as regards a certain quasi-critical doctrinairism that rests on quite arbitrary assumptions, and is all too ready to make the mental capacity of a nineteenth-century professor the measure of what may have been possible on the highest plane of religious experience that mankind has known. The analysis of the material in regard to " The Appearances of the Risen Lord " by the editor is remarkable for its critical acumen, and the illustrative material he brings in from the field of mystical experience is very suggestive; yet it seems necessary before making further use of this material to be quite clear about how far one is willing to concede to these experiences a validity similar to that which " Catholic " Christianity at least must always assign to the visions of the Risen Lord. And when the author, in his critical enquiry, stops at the empty tomb, I would not, indeed, dare to say that he is wrong, but does not this exemplify what has been said above about the necessary limits of a critical Catholicism ? Mr. N. P. Williams's enquiry into the Origins of the Sacraments will, I suppose, be considered as one of the most important contributions. I would not question his general contentions about the genuinely Christian origin of the sacraments. But he does not seem to have felt the full force of the critical standpoint. This does not lie, at present, as far as I can see, in the Mystery hypothesis; as regards the origin of the sacraments, notably the

Eucharist, this has gradually evaporated in vague assertions; as regards their later history, the matter stands differently. But the real difficulty now is the combined evidence of Acts, St. Luke xxiv. (compared with other relations of meals at which the Risen Lord appears), *Didache* and some of the apocryphal acts of the Apostles for a form of early community meal that seems to have but little to do with the commemoration of the Lord's death and the synoptic, or Pauline, relations of the Last Supper. Even if it is, as I think, still quite possible to assert the genuineness and original character of these relations, this must be acknowledged to present the real problem. I do not think, either, that Mr. Williams has been very happy in his attempt to defend the authenticity of the "command to repeat" in the Pauline (and perhaps Lucan) relation of the institution. In making this the central point, he has weakened the force of his argument. His theory of Mark xiv. 25 ("I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day that I drink it new in the kingdom of God") as a substitute for "This do in remembrance of me," is very far from convincing. The eschatological conception is a dangerous handmaid, and may not be willing to leave on so short notice as may be convenient for a "Catholic" employer. But, after all, is it necessary to attach so much importance to the genuineness of the express command? Is not the very existence of the whole institution narrative in the earliest tradition the best proof that the first Christian community, the faith of which is reflected in this tradition, connected their own sacred meal with the Saviour's act on the night that he was betrayed? And can we, from a purely critical point of view, get beyond this? I have dwelt on this question not only because of its material importance; it illustrates, it seems, the tendency, already mentioned, to make the biblical material hold more of definite "Catholicism" than it naturally does. This does not, in fact, disprove "Catholicism," but it means that its foundations must be sought primarily in the entire experience of the Church, part of which only is to be found inside the sacred canon. In this respect, also, one cannot but find a certain discrepancy of view, or at least of method, between this essay and the writers on the question of "authority."

These remarks imply also that the "Catholicity" of the essays is subject to certain limitations. But I would rather begin with a recognition of its reality. If Catholicity means a real fidelity to the Christian tradition in its completeness, this book has a real Catholic message. The way in which the philosophical *Vindication of Religion* (A. E. Taylor) has been restated, the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation reaffirmed (by L. S. Thornton and J. K. Mozley), constitutes a very timely challenge to those parts of Christianity where theological thought has gradually become, under the influence of Ritschl and Herrmann, all too shy of treading the paths of speculative thought, and inclined to depreciate all philosophical doctrines of the Godhead. Yet there are many signs of a strong reaction in favour of metaphysical dogma in recent German theology. It is to be hoped that these tendencies will be confronted with Anglican and Orthodox Catholicism at the conference on Faith and Order to be held next year at Lausanne. Amongst the essays which have just been mentioned, perhaps Dr. Mozley's would have been more helpful, if it had been less encumbered with technical details of dogma: it hardly brings out with sufficient clearness the positive religious values of the idea of the Incarnation, which meet one with such marvellous vividness—*e.g.*, in the sermons of Scott Holland.

There is, however, a traditional nebulousness around the Anglican conception of Catholicity. And my chief complaint against the essays would be that they, far from dissolving the clouds, labour with two different ideas of what is involved in their grand theme—perhaps one might say that they confound Catholicity and Catholicism. I find what I would recognize as real Catholicity in the philosophical and doctrinal sections to which I have referred just now, and also in Dr. Rawlinson's definition of authority, which seems to include all genuine Christian experience. On the other hand, there is the "Catholicism" of the definitely sacramental type of Christianity, corresponding to a certain ethical ideal—which might be described as the traditional ideal of saintliness. The latter may not be brought out with any completeness in this volume—its value as a characterizing document would have been increased, if this had been the case—but it is implied in Mr. Knox's argumentation (p. 108), and it is perhaps not illegitimate to supplement what is actually said here with statements familiar to Anglo-Catholic theology since W. G. Ward's *Ideal of a Christian Church.* The sacramental side, on the other hand, is strongly emphasized. Much that is said here is of great value, not only for the better understanding the Anglo-Catholic type of piety, but also as contributions to eucharistic theology in general. I would here call attention to what Dr. Mozley has to say of the nature of grace (pp. 226 f., 241 f.). In Mr. Spens' essay on the Eucharist a Lutheran student may note, with some satisfaction, that the definition of the Eucharistic Presence comes very near to the standards of his own Church—quite definite as the author seems to be as regards the continued existence of the natural substances after consecration, he is farther from the doctrine of Transubstantiation than he perhaps realizes—while, on the other hand, a Lutheran will feel obliged to disclaim the consequences that Mr. Spens draws as to adoration of the reserved Sacrament. It would be interesting to discuss Mr. Spens' theory of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, but this cannot be done here. I would certainly not question the place of the sacraments as an essential part of the Church's heritage, but I would claim that the emphasis might vary according to different types and temperaments, that there is place within the Catholic Church for a minimizing as well as for a maximizing of the *efficacia signa*, although, personally, I would be most in favour of the latter alternative. And I think that it would be possible to prove that both lines have coexisted within bodies whose Catholicity the writers of the essays would recognize.

The confusion as to the real content of the word "Catholic" is also reflected in a certain lack of definiteness in regard to the idea of the Church. Where is that inspired body whose authority a liberal Catholicism has to proclaim? What are its characteristics, where its limits? To these questions I cannot find that a real answer is given. From a critical point of view, Mr. Milner White's eloquent hymn to the Catholic Church must be considered very unsatisfactory. And it is important to note that none of the essayists has, as far as I have seen, dealt with the crucial questions of Order and Episcopacy; on the other hand, this, of course, corresponds to a general shifting of emphasis from questions of Church polity to the sacramental character of religion in modern Anglican Catholicism. Anyhow, the apparent indefiniteness as to the limits of the Church, and consequently also as to the content of authoritative tradition, is traceable in various ways. The important question here is how far the experience of those Christian bodies that have not preserved the

outward notes, on which the Anglican Church rests its claims as a branch of the Catholic Church, is to be considered a genuine part of the Church's heritage. Here I cannot but find that the treatment which the Reformation has received in some of the essays is far from satisfactory. It might be possible to deal with the "Anglican solution," as Professor Hamilton Thompson does so well, as nothing more than a change of Church polity; but the historian who does not see how the real importance of the movement lies in a rediscovery of fundamental values, in an intensity of religious experience, that may be one-sided, but has seldom been equalled in the Church, only shows his blindness for the really important issues of the period. And when the whole of non-Anglican reformed Christendom is referred to as an indiscriminate mass of sects of no particular importance, this shows neither a "Catholic" nor a "critical" spirit. The writer holds no brief for "Protestantism" as a whole—in fact, he does not like the designation—but as regards those Lutheran bodies round the Baltic with which he is familiar, he must claim that they represent a continuous development of the ancient Christian Church in these countries (at any rate as much as the Anglican Church in England about A.D. 1800), that they, whatever their defects may be, have produced genuinely Christian types of life and devotion, and have preserved to this day the ministration of the Word and the Sacraments. He can see no plausible reason, at least from the point of view of these essays, why their experience should not have as good a claim as that of any other body to be a genuine part of God's continued self-revelation in the universal Church. Moreover, he would claim for Martin Luther a place as the greatest religious genius of the Church in modern times. A Catholicity which excommunicates that strange messenger of God, without sharing, on the other hand, in the large organic life of the Latin Church, would seem not only insular and unattractive, but unworthy of its name. Mr. Wilfred Knox makes an honest attempt to account for the strange phenomenon of Protestantism in an appended note to his essay on Authority. There may be some truth in his contention that "the strength of Protestantism lies in the fact that it emphasizes certain elements of Catholicism." But may it not be the case that these elements have been neglected or have fallen in oblivion in other branches of the Church, or that only here their full importance has been brought to light? An analysis of the essays on *Aspects of Man's Condition* and *The Atonement* might presumably lead to the conclusion that the "Catholic" view of these subjects here stated would have gained considerably through a study of the experience and religious thought of those communions that claim to carry on the Augustinian tradition on these points.

If these remarks seem not only inadequate—as they are bound to be—but rash or aggressive, this is certainly not due to lack of appreciation or sympathy on the part of the reviewer. Rather it is because I feel very keenly the importance of the task and admire the honest, sometimes brilliant, work of the essayists, that I would urge on them to consider the possibility that the problem which confronts them is greater perhaps than they have so far discovered, and that its solution is far from being achieved, and that the quest for a real Catholicity must start from a frank recognition and appreciation of *all* genuinely Christian experience, that it calls for the collaboration of thinkers in many communions. And to-day, many minds in different countries feel with an increasing vividness that the central problem of Christian faith is implied in the words "Catholic and critical."

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We beg to acknowledge with thanks some interesting pamphlets and papers. (1) *Presbyterian Orders*, one of the occasional papers of the Scottish Church Society, asserts the principle that "Historical Presbyterianism in general, and the Church of Scotland in particular, follow to its logical conclusion their teaching that commission to the Ministry can be given by the commissioned only, and they stand by the doctrine of Apostolical Succession." And it closes by appealing to Presbyters to maintain their own Orders instead of "acquiescing in the position that any 'Church' can originate and authorize and equip a Ministry for itself." It is evident that the late Dr. Cooper has found worthy successors to carry on his work. (2) *Materials for the Study of Adult Religious Education* can be obtained, price threepence, from the Honorary Secretary, Bishop of Manchester's Group, 30, Primrose Hill Road, London, N.W. 3. The document contains an interesting survey of work already being done in various dioceses, though it could be made more complete. (3) *In the Light of the World Call* is the title of the Short Report of the C.M.S., 1925-26.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,

The novel and interesting suggestion given by Professor Turner that the "Two Witnesses" or "Martyrs" of Rev. xi. should be identified with St. Peter and St. Paul (*cf.* Theology, October, 1926, p. 197) depends to a very considerable extent on the interpretation given to verse 8, "The Great City which is called Sodom and Egypt, where also their Lord was crucified." The majority of scholars would deny that "the Great City" can refer to Rome, which it must do if the "witnesses" refer to the two Apostles in question. Lohrmeyer maintains that Jerusalem is in the Seer's mind (cf. *Die Offenbarung des Johannes*, S. 90), and Loisy is of the same opinion (*L'Apocalypse de Jean*, p. 212). Père Allo would give a wider interpretation—namely, that "the Great City" refers to the whole world, but that the immediate reference is to Jerusalem (*Saint Jean l'Apocalypse*, pp. 134-135). The veteran scholar, Dr. Zahn, without any discussion assumes that verse 8 can only refer to Jerusalem (*Die Offenbarung des Johannes*, Zweite Hälfte, S. 420).

Is it possible that the Seer would have his readers understand by "the Great City" both Jerusalem and Rome? The assertion that our Lord was crucified at Rome in the persons of His followers is neither fanciful nor far-fetched (*cf.* Acts ix. 4, 5; Acts of Peter, xxxv.; and, by way of contrast, Heb. vi. 6, x. 29).

It has also been objected that what is said in Rev. xi. 5 ff. and 8-12 could hardly be spoken of St. Peter and St. Paul, but in reply to this it may be urged, (1) seeing that the author made use of a Jewish document, not every detail should be pressed; (2) verse 6 might refer to the power of their prayers and the mighty works which do follow them; and (3) verse 11 would signify their triumphant martyrdom, which is not so highly coloured, considering its apocalyptic symbolism.

Be that as it may, we can hardly at present be confident, any more than Professor Turner seems to be, that "the Seer gives the earliest expression in extant Christian literature to the combination of the memory of the two great Apostles."

Yours faithfully,
W. H. Rigg.

THE SEVENTH CENTENARY OF ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI

The aim of this article is to give a brief account and some impressions of the celebrations of the Seventh Centenary of St. Francis, which are still in progress, but which have now passed their climax—the Feast of the Saint on October 4. It should perhaps be explained at the outset that the officially recognized Franciscan Year began with the Pardon at the Portiuncula on August 1, or rather with the Novena which preceded it, and that it continues until October 4, 1927. No programme has yet been issued for the period after January 1, and it is a little difficult to see how the celebrations for that later period will avoid the equal dangers of repetition and of anticlimax.

The more important ceremonies began in September, and of these I can speak from personal observation, having spent all September and the beginning of October in Assisi. It is obviously impossible to attempt any detailed description of all the celebrations, more particularly as the programme provided something of a more or less special character for almost every day. All that can be done is to mention some of the more important and interesting occasions, chiefly those which have a definite relation to the Franciscan narrative.

Sunday, September 5, was chosen to commemorate the home-coming of the sick Saint from Satriano to his native city of Assisi, where he was to be lodged in the Bishop's Palace. He had been met on his way by a company of horsemen from Assisi, sent to prevent the possibility of the cortège being intercepted by the Perugians, and thus to prevent the Saint cause to find his death-bed in Perugia. On the afternoon of September 5 a large company of the men of Assisi went out on horseback—some of the steeds looked more like donkeys!—to meet the procession of Friars who were making their way from Satriano, carrying with them as a symbolic representation of the dying Francis one of his brown habits, which is preserved as a relic of great sanctity. The procession entered Assisi by the Porta Perlici, and made its way through the city to the Piazza in front of the Bishop's Palace, where it was met by the Bishop, Mgr. Luddi. The inhabitants crowded into the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, in former times the Cathedral, where the Relic was exposed on the High Altar. Benediction was then given by the Bishop in the usual way, and the Assisians crowded up to the altar to kiss the case containing the Habit.

The whole week from September 12 to 19 was naturally and properly devoted, not only at Assisi, but in all Franciscan shrines, especially La Verna, to the due recollection of the supreme spiritual experience of the Saint on or about Holy Cross Day, 1224, when the Stigmatization took place at the close of a long period of fasting and prayer. I was not able to visit La Verna itself until after the week in question, but I am bound to admit that I had strongly the impression that since my last

visit, now about fifteen years ago, the mountain had been lamentably institutionalized as a result of the new carriage road, the hotel, the booths, the crowds of pilgrims, and that the atmosphere of true and simple devotion, which had made it previously one of the most inspiring Franciscan shrines, had largely faded away. In San Francesco itself in Assisi there were solemn services on September 17, the day appointed for the Stigmata, the Friars exposing on the altar at Benediction the Relic specially associated with the Stigmata—viz., the bandage used by St. Francis to cover the wound in his side. This bandage is said to have been found on his body after his death.

The generally accepted date for the carrying of Francis from the Bishop's Palace to the Portiuncula, where he had chosen to meet death, is September 26, 1226. That day this year was accordingly selected for another ceremony to commemorate that closing chapter in the earthly career of the Saint. Once again the scene was set outside the Bishop's Palace, and a procession of Friars, headed by the Custos of the Sacro Convento bearing a Relic—this time the autograph Benediction of Brother Leo by St. Francis—made its way out of the city, followed by an immense number of the Assisians. Half-way down to the Portiuncula they were met at the site of the former Lepers' Hospital by a similar procession from the Portiuncula. At the Lepers' Hospital a pause was made, and in memory of the act of St. Francis seven centuries before in turning and blessing the city of his birth with the well-known blessing, the aged Bishop of Assisi, raising from the temporary altar by the wayside the Relic of the Saint, gave with the Relic the identical blessing to the city of Assisi and its inhabitants which had been first given on September 26, 1226.

The culminating ceremonies were, of course, those of October 3 and 4, and for them the Pope, unable to be present in person for obvious reasons, sent Cardinal Merry Del Val as his Legate *a latere*. So far as the Portiuncula is concerned, the most important occasion was on October 3, when at sunset, after solemn Vespers, the actual death of St. Francis —the Transitus—was remembered. After the singing of the Psalm, *Voce mea ad Dominum clamavi*—which was the Psalm sung by the sorrowing Friars around their master's death-bed—a silence of two minutes followed, and an impressive hush fell on the thousands who had crowded into the vast Basilica of St. Mary of the Angels. It could have been wished that the Friars would have realized the incredible unsuitability of having the Basilica lighted up for this touching ceremony with thousands of electric lights, which were put up and down at dramatic moments. On the other hand, nothing could well have exceeded the majesty and dignity of San Francesco as it was prepared for the midnight Mass in the early morning of October 4 or for the Pontifical High Mass which was the crowning feature of the Feast itself.

Under any circumstances, Mass in San Francesco is impressive on account of the amazing beauty and dignity of the great Basilica, which is renowned throughout the world on account of its architecture and on account of the richness of its artistic adornment. On such an occasion, however, as a High Mass on the Seventh Centenary of the death of St. Francis, the ceremony was bound to be one of unusual dignity and magnificence. I believe that one of the most impressive parts of the whole ceremony was the Procession from the Upper Church to the Lower Church, in which the Cardinal Legate was preceded by four other Cardinals—Bonzano, Granito di Belmonte, Laurenti, and Ceretti—and by a large number of Archbishops

and Bishops, and by the Ministers General of the three branches of the Franciscan Order. Unfortunately it was not possible for me to see this Procession outside the church, as it was obviously impossible to be at the same time outside the church and see the Procession, and inside the church to be present at the Mass; and those who were outside the church had very little chance of making their way into the church itself. Of the Mass itself it is difficult to say more than it was rendered with remarkable dignity by the Cardinal Legate, assisted by the Custos of the Sacro Convento, and that the music was of the highest possible order.

In conclusion, I want to give a few general impressions based upon participation in these ceremonies at Assisi, and written from the point of view of an Anglo-Catholic layman.

There can be no doubt that the Seventh Centenary of St. Francis has stirred the religious life of Italy, and indeed of the whole Catholic world, to an extent commensurate with the almost unique position occupied by St. Francis in the life and devotion of the Church. While the ceremonies have naturally drawn a considerable number of ordinary tourists and sight-seers, they have attracted a much larger number of genuine pilgrims of all classes of society, from the highest classes to the peasants and the illiterate. There has, of course, been the danger, not altogether avoided, that the ceremony should be made the occasion of raising money for various projects in connection with the Franciscan Order; for example, the Franciscans at St. Mary of the Angels are apparently raising large sums of money for building an enormous new façade for the Basilica, a fact which does not particularly matter, as it can scarcely make the Basilica itself uglier than it is at present! I have already referred to the tendency to institutionalize La Verna. At the same time, these appear to me incidental features of the ceremonies, and features which can scarcely, in the circumstances, be completely avoided.

Another aspect which impressed me greatly was the atmosphere of devotion created by Benediction. On many evenings during the month, especially at San Francesco, the Basilica was crowded with people who had come evidently from their daily work to hear a sermon, generally of prodigious length—for example, Cardinal Maffi preached for an hour and twenty minutes, while his congregation stood patiently and with obvious attention—and to be present at Benediction which was given at the conclusion of the sermon. Any doubt which I had ever had as to the value of Benediction as a medium of devotion, and as a means of attracting the people who would otherwise not come to any evening service, was removed by what I saw in Assisi.

An incidental impression was the obviously improved relations between Church and State in Italy, resulting, so far as I could observe, very largely from Fascismo. In all the most important functions the civil authorities were closely associated with the religious authorities; the Mayor of Assisi and the members of the Commune were invariably present, and in the case of street processions, members of the Fascist party in their black shirts walked ahead of the processions to invite any members of the public who had forgotten to take off their hats, to remove them as soon as possible before the Blessed Sacrament or the Relics passed. It is, of course, difficult to decide to what extent this is a permanent or, on the other hand, a passing feature of life in Italy, but it seems a very promising one so far as it goes.

WALTER SETON.

REVIEWS

THE POETRY OF OUR LORD, AN EXAMINATION OF THE FORMAL ELEMENTS OF HEBREW POETRY IN THE DISCOURSES OF JESUS CHRIST, by the Rev. C. F. Burney, M.A., D.Litt. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1925. 15s.

Dr. Burney, who died April 15, 1925—*o doctiorum quicquid est assurgite huic tam uevendo nomini*—had written the preface and completed this last work in December 1924, and it stands a worthy monument of his genius, beautiful to read. A sequel in some sort to *The Aramaic origin of the Fourth Gospel* it has a larger air: *The Poetry of our Lord*—a kindly theme.

In our Lord as in the prophets poetic thought and language is evident to every reader, but such vague appreciation loses half the truth which the patient student may deeply enjoy, and will enjoy with Dr. Burney to guide him.

Dr. Burney first explains the principles of poetic composition in the Old Testament, advancing step by step to more and more precision; from general parallelism to its particular divisions; to the rhythm or measure which points the parallelism; to the accentual system of lines and (if the term be allowed) of feet, which are the regulations of variety in all languages and in Hebrew poetry of a very free variety such as gives one the feeling of nature itself, of the wind on the mountains, the waving foliage of Lebanon, the surging sea. All this is illustrated amply from Prophets as well as from Psalms, Job, Song of Songs, Proverbs. Then with still ampler and carefully selected examples Dr. Burney proves that the like poetic practice is to be found in our Lord's teaching.

So far he will hardly be telling news to most of his readers, yet even the most of them will be impressed by the multitude and exactness of correspondences which scholarly care has accumulated in order that, like Theophilus, of things of which we have already learned the elements we may know the certainty.

At p. 100 more exciting matter begins. Different forms of Old Testament poetry are distinguished and reviewed: in particular the poetic habits of the prophets are examined, how they pass into rhythm and out of it again, how they launch their utterance in public spontaneously and then perhaps revise their language for writing:—but let Dr. Burney himself be quoted:

" In speaking of our Lord's use of rhythm, it is well to begin with a word of caution. The employment of rhythm in poetical composition naturally involves some amount of artifice, and, *for its perfection*, usually demands from the poet thought and

labour. We may regard the Psalms as poems upon which a good deal of labour was expended by their authors in working them into poetical form. The Prophets, on the other hand, we picture as uttering their oracles to a large extent without previous preparation; and it seems obvious that they must have done so when speaking on the spur of the moment under the sudden access of the Divine afflatus. Yet their most impassioned oracles, which (so far as we can judge) would be spoken most directly under sudden inspiration, are usually those which exhibit most clearly the characteristics of Hebrew poetry; and it is obvious that they must have possessed wonderful powers of poetical improvisation. We should naturally expect, however, to find the prophetic oracles less rhythmically perfect than are most of the Psalms; even though it be possible that, when a prophecy came to be committed to writing, the prophet may have aimed at making it more formally perfect as a poetical composition than it was when he first improvised it. If the telling phrase which leaped to his mind on the spur of the moment would not fit into his rhythm, we cannot suppose that he would have rejected it on that account; nor in subsequent revision (if this took place) can we think that he would have cared to improve it away in favour of some expression less telling but more rhythmically perfect. As a fact, we *do* find less rhythmical perfection with prophetic oracles than, e.g. in the Psalms or in Job; yet this occasional rhythmical roughness does not, on the one hand, indicate that they are not to be taken as poetical compositions; nor on the other hand, on the assumption that they *are* poetry, does it justify us in emending them to produce a dead level of rhythmical uniformity. They *are* poetry without a doubt, in form no less than in thought, albeit that their rhythm may sometimes fail of perfection, and that they may exhibit quick alternation from one form of rhythm to another. It may be questioned indeed whether perfect rhythmical regularity was regarded by the Hebrews as a poetical merit. We rarely find it, even in the Psalms."

Is it worth while to add a rather striking instance of the way in which a prophet moved by emotion falls into a kind of trance, and so passes from prose to poetry while the vision lasts? In the book of Jeremiah, ch. xxxviii., there is a conversation between Zedekiah and Jeremiah, Jeremiah being in prison, the siege nearing its inevitable end, the king asking advice and receiving the prophet's warning to surrender. He fears his fierce nobles too much to acquiesce. Then the vision falls upon Jeremiah of the sack and misery and shame, and he drops into the *Kinah* or dirge measure. The trance and the poetic utterance

only last a minute or two, and the colloquy ends as it began in prose.

Our Lord's use is like the prophet's. He is free in his poetic speech and passes from prose to poetry as occasion offers. But the poetry, i.e. the proper measured rhythm, keeping the rules, is frequent. This may be observed even in the Greek translations of our Lord's words on which we are dependent. For rhythm follows parallelism, and while the parallelism is still evident, comparison with Old Testament examples shews that rhythm is inherent in the very form.

Give not | the holy thing | to the dogs
And cast not | your pearls | before swine

has a term to term, or foot to foot, resemblance to

He that planted | the ear | shall he not hear ?
He that formed | the eye | shall he not see ?

as we hear even in the double English translation.

Moreover we are not altogether dependent on the Greek. Dr. Burney can translate it into biblical Aramaic, which may then be compared with rhythmical passages in Daniel, and the correspondence is exact. Nor perhaps (we may add) need we be too strict about Aramaic limits. The Hebrew Bible of the synagogue and of home-reading would affect our Lord's cadences in any language; as might appear in the kindred case of *Benedictus Magnificat* and *Nunc Dimittis*.

This leads farther. In tracing our Lord's words beyond and behind the Greek record of them we may sometimes distinguish between two versions of the record, e.g. the Lord's Prayer or the Beatitudes in *Matthew* and *Luke*. Sometimes a word or clause, suspected on other grounds, proves recalcitrant prose in a running piece of poetry. There is an instance of this in Mark xiii. 10 " And unto all nations first must the gospel be preached." The " little apocalypse (Mark xiii. 9-13) is distinguished from the rest of the chapter by its rhythm ": in the parallel passage of *Luke* (xxi. 12-19) this clause is omitted though all the rest appears. " The parallel in Luke " however " is so paraphrased as to remove all traces of rhythm, and is therefore, *in form*, less original. . . . The true parallel is found in Matt. x. 17-22, which corresponds exactly in extent with the Marcan passage which we have distinguished from the rest of Mark xiii. solely on the ground of rhythm "; and here (besides many interesting lines of enquiry into the early history of the church and the sources and composition of the gospels which Dr. Burney opens) we notice that v. 23 " For verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel

till the Son of man be come" is unrhythmical "and in this respect stands out of relation to its context."

Critics with whom Dr. Burney would hardly be in sympathy might make capital out of these two omissions, and we are all the more impelled to confirm our trust in his confident essay. Do we in very deed, when we hear the gospels read, hear the words repeated as they came from our Lord's lips—his very words?

The question recurs more surprisingly still when we pass to the Gospel according to S. John. Here most readers would suppose that our Lord's words (if not his thought and meaning) were quite transformed by the modernizing evangelist. Dr. Sanday, following Dr. Drummond, had noticed that long discourses were not really characteristic of this gospel. It has very many terse oracular sayings. Matthew Arnold had declared these to be the important matter, while the narratives were mainly scenes wherein the evangelist might plant the dominant *Logion:* e.g. the raising of Lazarus and "I am the resurrection and the life." Now Dr. Burney applies his method and gets precise results. He finds special forms of rhythm in special moods and themes. After translating John xiv. 1-10 "straightforwardly into Galilean Aramaic" he remarks:

"If our conclusion is well grounded that this passage really offers an example of the four-beat rhythm which we have seen to characterize similar teaching in the Synoptists, we have here a fact which is of the first importance for the substantial authenticity of the Last Discourses. Without maintaining that they represent throughout the *ipsissima verba* of our Lord, we may reasonably infer that they have been recorded by an actual hearer, in whose mind the familiar rhythm was still running, even after a long lapse of years, and who was able to record with substantial accuracy the well-remembered words in the form in which they were conveyed. It does not of course follow that, in order to prove the authenticity of the rest of the Discourses, they must be shown to be in the same rhythm throughout. The Synoptic evidence rather suggests that our Lord varied the form in which He conveyed His teaching to His disciples. Traces of the same rhythm can, however, be detected elsewhere in the Discourses; cf. xiv., 15, 18, 21a, 23a, 24a, 27, xv., 5."

This is indeed arresting. But we cannot forget that this evangelist was a very great artist. His uniquely deep and sacramental theology was thoroughly involved with that special faculty and mode of inspiration. Among his commentators those have penetrated most profoundly into his lucid truth who

have most frankly reverenced his holy art. But such reverence demands frankness and sets questions. Do the vivid narratives, the touches of character, all the accenting modifying dramatic masteries, spring out of his art, or are these the exactnesses of a historian, or are they simply the compulsion of personally remembered fact? And is this echo of synoptic rhythm a kindred problem?

It is so subtle and so delicate. And here again Dr. Burney comes forward putting a fresh complexion upon the problem. He proceeds to discussion of rhyme. And a friend's objection to his argument from translating back to what he believes the original authentic words of our Lord in Aramaic,—viz. that all Aramaic terminations rhyme, that rhyme is cheap in Aramaic—is met beforehand by a sketch of Old Testament development of rhyme: (1) popular and rude; (2) while the convention is still preserved that rhyme belongs to the people, it becomes in the *Song of Songs* and the gnomic writers of the Hebrew Wisdom a delicate exercise in art: no easy monotony of case-endings and verb-inflexions in any language could breed such grace.

This may be well seen in the first example given, the Lord's Prayer (p. 161). Dr. Burney has translated the prayer into Aramaic, so transliterated and so plainly set out in lines of verse, that it can be easily read and the music of it heard. It is thus recognized as a very perfect lyric with simple but exquisite arrangement of rhymes. "An elaborate system of rhyme" says Dr. Burney; but "elaborate" is too heavy an epithet. This is "for the people," artless art but consummate.

And generally, our Lord's rhyming oracles are popular in their address. "It may be noticed that both examples of rhyme cited from the Fourth Gospel are addressed to the *am ha'ares* or common people, to whom the Synoptic discourses from which we have culled other frequent illustrations of the use of rhyme were directed," writes Dr. Burney.

The rhyming Lord's Prayer is the prayer in *Matthew*; in *Luke* the prayer has no rhyme. For this and other reasons of poetry Dr. Burney decides that *Matthew* gives the true original, *Luke* an altered report. With "poor in spirit" in the Beatitudes it is the other way, he thinks. Yet Luke's omission of "in spirit" fits the tendence of his idea, and there are many examples in *Matthew* of that perfect utterance, that final phrasing, which might come from repeated experiment in church reading. Dr. Burkitt in *The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus* hints at this characteristic of *Matthew*, the hieratic gospel. We muse on "Come unto me all ye that are weary, ..." and the commission to S. Peter outside Cæsarea Philippi, and the baptismal formula in the last chapter. The suspicion

insistently recurs that what Dr. Burney assigns to the art of our Lord may often be due to the mediated or instinctive art of the evangelists or of the Aramaic precursors of the Greek evangelists.

And yet:—Dr. Burney has collected material for a fair rebutment of objections. During the long idleness of a summer day the objections rise in the vague expansion of reverie. When the serene night brings the hour of concentrated study they lose their substance. Are we not compelled to yield a happy faith that he has indeed recovered at least some echo of the tones of the Saviour's voice?

If so, one last reflexion flits across the mind. Though we wonder at the terse brevity of our Lord's recorded teaching and fancy that he must have "preached" in reality at greater length with colloquial freedom, perhaps it was not so. Perhaps he was artist through and through, and knit his wisdom and imagination firmly, and valued economy of talk; half more than whole; one thing needful; for every idle word austere account.

A. Nairne.

The Incarnation. Papers from the Summer School of Catholic Studies held at Cambridge, July 25-31, 1925. Edited by the Rev. C. Lattey, S.J. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd. 7s. 6d.

In two ways is this volume of special interest and value: first as giving us a comprehensive survey by Roman Catholic scholars of the issues, Biblical, historical, doctrinal, and apologetical, which naturally arise in connection with Christology; and, secondly, for its bearing on the problem of reunion. Father Knox, in his paper on "Kenotic Theories," quite rightly draws attention to this. It is certainly desirable to know whether, in any conceivable form of reunion between the Church of England and the Church of Rome, there would be no legitimate place, even in the portion of the theological field assigned to allowable speculations, for such a Christology as we associate with Bishop Gore or any other modern theologian who believes that Christ was God but holds some form or other of kenotic doctrine. I gather, not from Father Knox alone, that such a place would be very difficult—he and others would, I imagine, say impossible—to secure.

Of the papers the first three are introductory, dealing with "Messianic Expectation in the Old Testament," "The Preparation of Jewry," and "The Preparation of the Gentiles." In the first two the forward-looking aspect of the Old Testament is emphasized, in the third Father Martindale is largely concerned

to argue that pagan schisms and cults did little to prepare the way for Christianity, and that the real preparation was the dissatisfaction which had resulted from the religious experiments of the world which Christianity entered. So we come by different ways to the conclusion that Christianity derives from the Jews, and is not the one system of the ancient world to make a lasting success of religious syncretism.

It is natural to class together Father Pope on "The Synoptic Gospels," Father Martindale on "The Gospel of Saint John," and Father Lattey on "Saint Paul"—especially on Philippians ii. 1-11. Father Pope exhibits the Synoptic testimony as to our Lord's Person. His obvious dissent from the familiar lines of approach to the Synoptic problem seems to me more important in his article than Dr. Boylan's implied but unemphasized Old Testament conservatism in the earlier one on Messianic Expectation. Father Pope masses the Synoptic evidence, quoting particularly from St. Matthew. He brings out briefly and powerfully the mystery of the Christ of the Synoptists; but in what has been for so long the very centre of critical investigation, with such important reactions upon theology, I could have wished for more of analysis and apologetic. Father Martindale has a remarkable chapter on Saint John's Gospel, and the interpretation he gives is, as he points out, largely independent of critical questions. Father Lattey has an admirably full and satisfying statement on the great Philippian passage. He agrees with Lightfoot as to the passive sense of ἁρπαγμός, and pays a tribute to that great scholar specially fitting at a Conference in Cambridge. But I wish he had said something on such a passage as 1 Cor. xv. 28 and its place in St. Paul's Christology.

There follow the two longest articles in the book, by Canon Myers on "The Fathers and the Councils," and by the Rev. M. de la Taille on "The Schoolmen." Canon Myers has a valuable section on the Historical Setting. When he comes to the great controversies themselves he raises, amid much on which there would be general agreement, certain questions which deserve a fuller examination than can be given here. Does the phrase ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, as used by Cyril, simply mean true or real union, and is it, and that other phrase ἕνωσις φυσική, free from any suspicion of a doctrine of one nature? Why does Canon Myers attribute to Nestorius a doctrine of ἕνωσις προσώπων, when in his Apology Nestorius says the union is not of persons but of natures? And was the Monophysite controversy simply the product of a misunderstanding of the exact meaning of technical terms? I think Canon Myers very likely right in his view that Nestorius has been too easily rehabilitated, and that "St. Cyril has a bad press," but

it is possible that a mean between Canon Myers and Canon Raven needs to be reached if we are to judge truly of the Christological controversies. Père de la Taille first expounds "the dogmatic Truth," and then goes on to consider the problem involved in the union of the human nature with the Divine Person. It is a remarkable study in the science of Christology, and concludes with a discussion of the problem of Christ's knowledge, which finds its solution in the distinction between higher and lower knowledge: "supposing the locks between the levels to be opened, then He would 'know' in every possible way. Should they remain closed, then He would 'not know' by knowledge specifically human"; yet still He did know, "not only as God, but also as Man, both by beatific vision and by the consequent infused science."

The last three articles are by Father Garde on "Our Lady in the Early Church," Father Knox on "Kenotic Theories," and Dr. Richard Downey on "Rationalist Criticism." Undoubtedly neglect of the part taken by the Blessed Virgin in connection with the Incarnation, and of the honour due to her, means a break with the mind of the quite primitive Church. At the same time, the phrase "Co-redemptrix," which Father Garde uses, goes beyond the patristic idea of Mary as the second Eve. Father Knox's attack on "Kenotists," brilliant though its dialectic is, seems to me to suffer from the early and, I believe, almost wholly untrue assumption that "to the Kenotist the Divine Being is simply Man with certain of Man's limitations and disabilities removed." Nor does the Kenotist believe that in the Incarnation the Nature of the Word was changed into the whole Man. Kenotism presents real difficulties. The Bishop of Manchester in *Christus Veritas* has drawn attention to them. But on Father Knox's showing Kenotists must be simply bad and stupid theologians—which seems to me to prove much too much. Dr. Downey's article makes good points in apologetic, but is a little discursive.

The book is certainly one to be read. But I should like to see the writers going to work on a larger scale and with a quite different audience and set of readers in view. It is on the apologetical side of their Christology that more light would be welcome. It is, of course, no reproach to them that there is not more of it in these particular lectures.

J. K. Mozley.

NOTICES

JAMES COOPER—A MEMOIR. By H. J. Wotherspoon, M.A., D.D. Longmans. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Wotherspoon has given us in this book a well-written and deeply interesting biography of a very remarkable and quaint personality. There is a note of sadness and tragedy in it, too, for in the later years of his life, and much more markedly since his death, the Established Church of Scotland, which seemed twenty years ago to be turning her eyes longingly towards union with the Anglican Church, has taken a new orientation in precisely the opposite direction. It is not difficult to trace many of the influences which brought about the change of attitude. At the beginning of this century the agitation for disestablishment carried on by Dr. Rainy and Dr. Hulton was strong and menacing. They spoke of the destruction of the establishment as a step towards Presbyterian reunion, and perhaps it was in accordance with what we call "human nature" for the Church attacked to reply: "If disestablishment comes, we shall indeed think of reunion, but it will not be with those who have warred against us, but with the Episcopal Church which alone among Scottish Churches has refused to aid in our downfall." Shortly, however, after the death of its leaders, the agitation for disestablishment suddenly died away, and proposals for a purely Presbyterian reunion took their place and were favourably received on both sides. Then the really great men who had striven so hard to organize an "Oxford Movement" in the Presbyterian Church—men like Dr. Milligan, Dr. John McLeod, Dr. Sprott—had passed away, and Dr. Cooper was left almost alone, a romantic and lovable personality, winning on all hands affectionate admirers rather than vigorous disciples, and his place has not been filled.

Again, the Lambeth appeal and proposals on reunion coming at the time they did, when the party, of whom the author is a distinguished survivor, was weak almost to extinction, has met with a hesitating, reluctant, and in every way disappointing response. It seems as though the definite reply of the Australian General Assembly just issued may be taken to express the general Presbyterian attitude everywhere. It is a definite refusal of the specific proposal about mutual commissions and a statement that "further co-operation towards reunion must be based on full recognition by the Churches of one another's Church standing . . . and of equal validity of one another's orders and Sacraments." As this amounts to a demand that the position should be made intolerable in the Anglican Church for all who hold the belief practically universal in East and West alike, and never doubted by anyone for 1,500 years—that Bishops only have authority in the Church to ordain—such a reply seems to bang and bolt the door to further efforts for the present.

Once again the rapid growth of the Anglo-Catholic movement and the happy and hopeful relations of the Anglican and Orthodox Churches have tended to move the former towards the right, while the coming Presbyterian union is distinctly a movement to the left. The theory which Dr. Cooper several times refers to that the Presbyterian Church preserved the Episcopate, though "in commission," is interesting, and it is quite possible to believe and to wish that it may be true without being at all satisfied about it. But even here the position is complicated by the

demand on the part of many that no union will be accepted which does not leave the uniting ministers free to have full intercommunion in the United Church with Congregationalists, Wesleyans, and others who have no similar historic claim.

Altogether the hope of ecclesiastical union between the Anglican and the Presbyterian Church, which once glowed brightly, and which held so large a place in the heart of Professor Cooper, has dwindled to-day—we say it with all sadness—to a very feeble spark. Perhaps the nearest approach is to be found in the Aberdeen memorandum referred to on p. 293 and published in his little book, *Reunion—a Voice from Scotland*. It was signed by leading representatives of the two great Presbyterian Churches and the Episcopal Church. Things have changed greatly since then, and not for the better. But the Professor himself never gave up hope, but believed and prayed to the end, and surely that is the best attitude for us all.

H. Erskine Hill.

Preaching in Mediæval England. By G. R. Owst, M.A., Cantab., Ph.D. (Lond.). Cambridge Press. 17s. 6d.

Dr. Coulton and Professor Claude Jenkins may well feel a certain pride of parenthood when they contemplate the result of their suggestion and stimulus to the author of this painstaking and scholarly treatise; for it fills a manifest and almost aching void in the English study of the Middle Ages. The Frenchmen—Hauréau, Lecoy de la Marche, Bourgain, and others—have used the wealth of the Parisian material to produce valuable studies of "La Chaire française." Dr. Gasquet did something, perhaps a rather superficial and sometimes misleading something, to make us realize that the subject was worth a deeper and a sounder probing. But the void remained, till now.

Every student of English ecclesiastical records is conscious of a desire to know more of what the Church had to say to the people about the things which pertain to the Kingdom of God. He sees all the machinery, and knows how it worked. He watches men being ordained and admitted to benefices and released from the daily obligations of their benefices in order that they may pursue the "studium generale." He finds them, "wriggling themselves" into bishoprics—the phrase is Horace Walpole's, but it will apply as well to the fourteenth century as to the eighteenth. And then at last he may realize that from time to time they preached, sometimes "ad populum" but more often within the walls of some great claustral chapel, to a little audience of religious, who made up the life of the place. Many a bishop followed the example of John Peckham when he visited Rochester and started from the terrifying gambit of "Descendam et videbo," till every brother felt as if he were Sodom and had become cold as Gomorrah. But what the normal bishop said on these occasions, and how he developed his "thema," no one knows. There is, indeed, a Bishop of Rochester, of whom Dr. Owst makes properly extended use—Thomas Brinton or, as he is here printed, Brunton—and who preferred a gentler line. He was speaking of the unity that should prevail within the house and interpreted "I and my Father are one" as meaning "I, monk of Rochester, and my father—*i.e.*, the bishop—are one." He has left a wealth of discourses.

But, apart from these special occasions and from certain notable pulpiteers, how far can we answer for it that the mediæval clergy were

diligent and capable in preaching? There are occasional but significant intimations that the answer cannot be very satisfactory. Let me take a case that I know, though it comes a little on the far side of Dr. Owst's period. Thomas de Cobham, my predecessor, 1317-27, kept at his side two Eremites of the order of St. Augustine; he wanted them, so he told their prior, not merely for their piety, but that they might relieve him by preaching sermons. He would put up the one to preach at a Visitation in Kidderminster church and the other at Bromsgrove. Yet he had a "posse" of capable clerks, and a "clerus" of great multitude; for he ordained about seventy priests each year. Yet he could not find men to preach in his stead out of all those hundreds.

On the other hand, there were places in which the people at large had a passion for hearing sermons, especially in the open air under conditions which added vastly to the preacher's ordeal, and to his merit if he succeeded in his task. There is frequent mention in this volume of Paul's Cross and the use that was made of it in this way. But more might have been said of the Londoner's appetite for these sermons, both at "Paul's" and at "The Spital." Dr. Owst gets near it on p. 23, but misses the point. "Maistir Richard Alkartoun," who holds forth "at Saint Marie Spitel, in Estir Weke" is not at all a sign that "some learned rector or vicar will be found occupying his own pulpit at least on the greater festivals." The pulpit Alkartoun was thus occupying was the open-air rostrum at "The Spital" in Bishopsgate; and the reference to what "I seide of late in a sermon at Poules cros" shows that this clerk was probably one of the Easter preachers of that year. It is, indeed, the original endowment of these Easter sermons, with subsequent augmentation, which provides the fee of the modern preacher in St. Paul's Cathedral on Sunday mornings.

The real value of this interesting study lies in its explanation of the way in which the pre-Reformation preaching came to travel in a narrow rut, which at last led it nowhere. It was the "summæ" with their "exempla," it was the "Tractatus de forma Sermonum," which turned a man's utterance from a message into an exercise. "Predicatio est thematis assumpcio, ejusdemque thematis divisio, thematis subdivisio," etc., till such Gospel as he had was choked.

Dr. Owst has the great advantage of producing some admirable illustrations which are the product of his own pencil. His literary style is profuse, to correspond with the extent of his knowledge. He more than once (pp. 17, 38) uses "episcopacy" where he means "episcopate." We have noted some textual errors which are worth considering for a new edition: "sanctum matrem ecclesiam" (p. 141); "aliatore" (p. 47, *n.*); "villam quemdam" (p. 61, *n.* 2); "the bailiff, the bishop, *and* lawyer, the usurer" (p. 301); "inveniantur" (p. 39, *n.*); "quidam sisterciencis ordinis" (p. 62, *n.*); "ventus Borialis" (p. 65, *n.*); of which some may be due to monkish Latinity, and all, taken together, are no blot on a piece of clean and capable investigation.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

REALITY IN WORSHIP. A Study in Public Worship and Private Religion. By Willard L. Sperry. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.

This is a book of quite unique importance. Its author is Dean of the Theological School in Harvard University, a scholar widely read in good literature and greater theology, a thinker of real insight into, and understanding of, the essentials of religion, a "humanist" in the best sense of

the word. This examination of the art and science of public worship is both detailed and complete. Dr. Sperry does not hesitate to follow his subject where it leads him into such difficult and fundamental topics as the significance of Jesus for the world's religion or the moral uses of joy. There is, indeed, an outline of a system of theology in this book, and a very human and thoughtful and sensitive theology it is.

It is clear that the influence of Dr. J. B. Pratt's important book on *The Religious Consciousness* is felt perhaps even more widely in America than in England. Dr. Sperry, at all events, is much indebted to it; and he brings all the resources of modern psychology to illuminate the problem of making public worship adequate to its purpose of expressing, quickening, and making more definite, the impulses of personal religion. Every parish priest will find valuable material here for the positive, constructive criticism of his own work in organizing and leading the worship of the people of God.

A. E. Baker.

To be Near unto God. By Abraham Kuyper, D.D. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

These one hundred and ten meditations on a single sentence of Psalm 73: "As for me, it is good to be near unto God," are taken from two thousand devotional meditations which were written by the remarkable man who was their author. In some sense they may be considered a fruit of the Oxford Movement, for one of the great formative influences in Dr. Kuyper's life was Miss Charlotte M. Yonge's *The Heir of Redclyffe*. He was one of the most remarkable Dutchmen of the nineteenth century, a minister of religion, a journalist, a University Professor, author of many books, leader of the anti-revolutionary party in the Netherlands Parliament, and for five years Prime Minister. This books shows that his life combined the gifts of Mary with those of Martha.

A. E. Baker.

The Psalter in Life, Worship, and History. By A. C. Welch, D.D. Clarendon Press. 5s.

There are few elements in Catholic worship more popular than the Psalms; when congregations object to the removal of Mattins from Sunday worship, that is sometimes the reason. Most of us, however, who have tried to read modern commentaries on the Psalms, have decided that it is impossible to be quite certain of the meaning of the Hebrew originals. In these four lectures Dr. Welch, a distinguished Presbyterian scholar, gives an admirable account of recent work on the Psalms; it is concrete, vivid, human, and very interesting. It will make many passages of the Psalter "live" for the ordinary man, and help him to a more intelligent understanding of the book as a whole.

A. E. Baker.

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